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PRUDENTIAL STANDING AND THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE: WHY THE "ZONE OF
INTERESTS" TEST SHOULD NOT APPLY TO
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Bradford C. Mank*
INTRODUCTION
In a unique decision, the Fifth Circuit in National Solid Waste
Management Ass'n v. Pine Belt Regional Solid Waste Management Authority'
("NSWMA") used the prudential "zone of interests"'2 standing test to bar the
plaintiffs, who met constitutional standing requirements, from filing a facial, per se
challenge under the dormant Commerce Clause.3 Six Mississippi counties and
cities that are members of the Pine Belt Regional Solid Waste Management
Authority ("the Authority") had enacted "flow control" ordinances that required all
solid waste collected in their six jurisdictions be sent to the Authority's facilities,
and, thus, prohibited the export of waste to alternative, cheaper, in-state or out-of-
state sites.4 Under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court had
invalidated as facially discriminatory a similar flow control ordinance requiring all
local waste be processed by a government-approved processor.5 This Article will
demonstrate that applying the murky "zone of interests" standing test to the ill-
defined dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is counterproductive.6 In general,
courts should require Commerce Clause plaintiffs and most other constitutional
litigants to show only that they have constitutional standing without the additional
hurdle of meeting the "zone of interests" standing test. Courts should recognize
that intrastate waste carriers harmed by a discriminatory ordinance that
* James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of
Law. I thank the Harold C. Schott Fund for financial support.
1. 389 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 332 (2005).
2. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
3. See Nat ' Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 389 F.3d at 493-503; infra notes 29-30
and accompanying text.
4. See Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass 'n, 389 F.3d at 494-96.
5. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); infra
notes 62, 72 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 43-46, 99-102, 137-53, 248-57, 262-86 and accompanying
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discriminates against both intrastate and interstate commerce are usually "reliable"
plaintiffs that may raise dormant Commerce Clause challenges. If the Court
abolishes the "zone of interests" test for constitutional cases, its Article III
standing requirements are sufficiently restrictive to prevent frivolous constitutional
suits, and courts could still apply other prudential limitations to standing.
The Fifth Circuit held that the two plaintiffs' allegations of financial harm
met the Constitution's Article II standing requirements to sue because invalidating
the ordinances would provide a remedy for their injuries.7 Rejecting First and
Ninth Circuit decisions allowing intrastate waste shippers to sue under the
Commerce Clause,8 however, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked
prudential standing under the "zone of interests" test to challenge the laws as
facially or per se discriminatory. 9 Conversely, because the ordinances imposed
higher costs on the plaintiffs' parent companies10 that affected their national and
regional competitive interests, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had "zone of
interests" standing to challenge whether the ordinances imposed excessive burdens
on interstate commerce under the "Pike balancing test."' The Fifth Circuit's fine
distinction between standing under the Pike and per se tests is unconvincing
because the Supreme Court has conceded that there is often no clear line between
the two.1
2
More broadly, it makes little sense to impose "zone of interests" barriers
in constitutional cases because the Supreme Court has never provided a clear test
for when a plaintiff has a relevant interest. 3 Since 1970, the Court has decided
only one constitutional case involving the zone of interests on the merits. In
7. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass 'n, 389 F.3d at 498.
8. Id. at 500 n. 16 (discussing disagreement with On the Green Apartments
L.L.C. v. City of Tacoma, 241 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2001) and Houlton Citizens' Coal. v.
Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178 (1st Cir. 1999)).
9. Id. at 498-500 & n.14.
10. Id. at 501 & n.18 (describing Waste Management, Inc. as the "parent"
company of Waste Management of Mississippi, Inc. and implying the same relationship
between BFI Waste Systems of Mississippi LLC and BFI Waste Systems). "Houston-based
BFI is the third-largest waste disposal company in the country. It is a subsidiary of the
second-largest such company, Allied Waste Industries of Scottsdale, Ariz.," which is now
also named Waste Industries USA, Inc. Jeffry Scott, Atlanta Trash Bids Due this Month:
Garbage Must Go Elsewhere as Dump Closes, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., Mar. 3, 2004, at
3B. Waste Management is the largest waste disposal company in the United States. Diane
Freeman, Area Collectors Talking Trash Rate Cuts, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 18,
2004, at lB.
11. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970); infra notes 31, 41-42 and
accompanying text. On the merits of the Pike claim, the Fifth Circuit required the plaintiffs
to show that the ordinances had a "disparate impact" on interstate commerce greater than
the laws' impact on intrastate commerce. See Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 389 F.3d at
500-03. Because the ordinances had approximately the same impact on both intrastate and
interstate waste hauling, the court held that the ordinances did not violate the Commerce
Clause under the Pike test. Id. A discussion of the Fifth Circuit's decision on the merits is
beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on standing issues.
12. See infra notes 43-46, 248-57 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 99-102, 137-53 and accompanying text.
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subsequent cases it has, however, discussed in dicta how and whether to apply the
test to constitutional issues.' 4 In Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass n,l a case
involving the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 16 Justice White's majority
opinion argued in dicta that the "zone of interests" test should primarily apply to
APA cases and focus on whether Congress intended to allow plaintiffs to use the
APA to sue to enforce specific federal statutory provisions.' 7 He stated that it is
difficult to fashion a comprehensive "zone of interests" test that applies to all
statutory and constitutional issues, and therefore, he implied that the test should be
limited to APA cases where it might be possible to fashion a workable standard."
By contrast, Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Wyoming v.
Oklahoma'9 argued that the test should apply in dormant Commerce Clause cases,
and more generally in all constitutional cases, as a way to reduce the load of
constitutional cases in federal courts. 20 Based on his argument that the State of
Wyoming did not meet the test because it had only an indirect interest in collecting
taxes from interstate trade and not a direct interest in selling coal in other states,
Justice Scalia would apparently apply the test so that only direct beneficiaries of
interstate trade are within the zone of interests, thereby further narrowing the
category of people with standing. His direct-indirect approach as to which
plaintiffs meet the test is contrary to precedent, he failed to demonstrate why the
test should not include indirect beneficiaries, and he did not offer a workable test
for distinguishing between direct and indirect beneficiaries.2'
If a plaintiffs suit serves the purposes of a constitutional provision,
whether the plaintiff directly benefits from the suit's invalidation of an
unconstitutional law or only indirectly benefits from the invalidation should be
irrelevant as long as the plaintiff meets Article III's standing test and does not raise
other prudential concerns.22 In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,
its only "zone of interests" test involving the Constitution and the dormant
Commerce Clause, the Court held that the plaintiffs allegations that a New York
transfer tax "indirectly" affected their ability to engage in interstate commerce was
sufficient to give them zone of interests standing.23 This holding appeared to
14. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977);
infra notes 23, 110, 124, 181, 206, 273 and accompanying text.
15. 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
16. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521
(2000).
17. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
19. 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
20. See id. at 473 (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra notes 121-31, 146-53, 268-89
and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 121-25, 150-51, 273-74 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 141-52, 268-89 and accompanying text.
23. 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977) (stating that the plaintiffs "are asserting their
right under the Commerce Clause to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminatory
taxes on their business and they allege that the transfer tax indirectly infringes on that right.
Thus, they are 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected ... by the ...
constitutional guarantee in question' (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
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include indirect beneficiaries within the dormant Commerce Clause's zone of
interests. Because of these varying definitions of who falls within the zone of
interests, the test is difficult to apply to constitutional issues, and federal courts
should presumptively vindicate the constitutional rights of those who meet Article
III's three-part standing test. Therefore, the Court should adopt a new rule that
limits the test to statutory claims only.
24
Part I of this Article will discuss the dormant Commerce Clause and flow
control ordinances to provide necessary background in understanding the Fifth
Circuit's decision. Part II will discuss standing and the prudential "zone of
interests" test. Part III will compare the Fifth Circuit's zone of interests analysis
with other circuits to demonstrate that the Fifth Circuit's approach to prudential
standing is flawed.
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND FLOW CONTROL
ORDINANCES
Subpart A will review the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Subpart B
will discuss flow control ordinances. Subpart C will examine the Carbone
decision, which struck down a facially discriminatory flow control ordinance.25
And Subpart D will examine the Mississippi flow control ordinances at issue
before the Fifth Circuit.
A. Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes. 26 The Supreme Court has also interpreted the Clause to contain
implicit or "dormant" limits that authorize federal courts to invalidate local laws
that burden the flow of interstate commerce.27 The dormant Commerce Clause
"prohibits economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures desifned to
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors."
The Court has used a two-part test to determine whether a law violates the
dormant Commerce Clause. First, a court applies a "virtually per se rule of
invalidity" 29 against laws that facially, purposefully, or effectively discriminate
against interstate trade. Such laws are invalid unless no nondiscriminatory
alternatives exist to achieve an important local purpose unrelated to economic
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970))); see infra notes 110, 123-25, 181, 206, 273-74 and
accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 137-52, 268-89 and accompanying text.
25. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. Cf Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-80
(1995); infra notes 28-42 and accompanying text. A minority of the Court, including
Justices Scalia and Thomas, has proposed to eliminate the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine either because it is not explicitly in the text of the Constitution or the doctrine is too
inconsistent. See infra notes 46, 253, 277 and accompanying text.
28. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).
29. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
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protectionism. 30 Second, "[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental," a court uses the Pike balancing test to examine whether a law's
burdens on interstate commerce are "clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. 31
In applying the per se test, the Court has used three different, sometimes
overlapping grounds for finding that a statute discriminates against interstate
commerce. 32 First, the easiest example of invalid discrimination is a local law that
facially discriminates by "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter., 33 Second, a
local law that appears to be facially neutral is invalid it if it was enacted by a
legislative body with the purpose of economic discrimination.34 Third, courts apply
the per se test against statutes with clearly discriminatory effects. 35
30. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392 ("Discrimination against interstate commerce
in favor of local business or investment is per se invalid, save in a narrow class of cases in
which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means
to advance a legitimate local interest."); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dep't of
Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 366 (1992) ("Because those provisions unambiguously
discriminate against interstate commerce, the State bears the burden of proving that they
further health and safety concerns that cannot be adequately served by nondiscriminatory
alternatives."); Natasha Ernst, Flow Control Ordinances in a Post-Carbone World, 13 PENN.
ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 53, 55 (2004); Douglas T. Kendall, Redefining Federalism, 35 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10445, 10459 (2005).
31. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); infra notes 41-46 and
accompanying text.
32. See McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429,
442 (6th Cir. 2000) ("When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against
interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-
state interests, [the Supreme Court has] generally struck down the statute without further
inquiry."); Julian Cyril Zebot, Awakening a Sleeping Dog: An Examination of the Confusion
in Ascertaining Purposeful Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 86 MINN. L. REv.
1063, 1076 (2002) ("A statute is per se invalid if it discriminates against interstate
commerce on its face, in its purpose, or in its effect." (citing Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 454-
55)).
33. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); see
also Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992) ("At a minimum such
facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose
and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives." (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322, 337 (1979)).
34. Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) ("A finding that state
legislation constitutes 'economic protectionism' may be made on the basis of...
discriminatory purpose .. "); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 336
(4th Cir. 2001) ("We conclude the record in this case establishes that no reasonable juror
could find that in enacting the statutory provisions at issue Virginia's General Assembly
acted without a discriminatory purpose."); Zebot, supra note 32, at 1077-84 (discussing
cases and observing that the law is not clear regarding what constitutes discriminatory
purpose under dormant Commerce Clause).
35. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194, 196 (1994)
("Massachusetts' pricing order is clearly unconstitutional. Its avowed purpose and its
undisputed effect are to enable higher cost Massachusetts dairy farmers to compete with
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In Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,36 the Court invalidated an
Alabama statute that imposed extra fees only on out-of-state waste. The Court
reasoned that: "Because the additional fee discriminates both on its face and in
practical effect, the burden falls on the State 'to justify it both in terms of the local
benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory
alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.' ' 37 In its first
"garbage" case, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,38 the Court struck down as per
se unconstitutional a New Jersey statute that prohibited the import of out-of-state
waste because the law reflected clear economic protectionism, and the state failed
to demonstrate that out-of-state waste was more dangerous than in-state waste.39 In
its only case upholding a facially discriminatory statute, the Court held that the
State of Maine could prohibit the importation of out-of-state baitfish because the
prohibition provided the only practicable means to prevent contamination of
Maine's rivers by parasites and alien fish species.4 °
If it is not facially, purposefully, or effectively discriminatory against out-
of-state interests, courts analyze a law using the Pike balancing test. Under the
Pike test, if a "statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.",4' The Pike Court further explained that:
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.42
The Court has acknowledged that it is often not clear whether a local law
with alleged discriminatory purposes or effects should be analyzed under the per se
lower cost dairy farmers in other States."); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 275-76 (1988) (invalidating reciprocal tax credit because it, "in effect, tax[es] a
product made by [Indiana] manufacturers at a rate higher than the same product made by
Ohio manufacturers"); Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 270 ("A finding that state
legislation constitutes 'economic protectionism' may be made on the basis of either
discriminatory purpose ... or discriminatory effect. ); Kendall, supra note 30, at
10460; Zebot, supra note 32, at 1065 n.15, 1081-82.
36. 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
37. Id. at 342 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333, 353 (1977)).
38. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
39. Id. at 624-28; Paula C. Murray & David B. Spence, Fair Weather
Federalism and America's Waste Disposal Crisis, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 71, 76-77
(2003).
40. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148-52 (1986); Kendall, supra note 30, at
10459 n. 117 (stating that Maine v. Taylor is the only case where the Supreme Court did not
invalidate a state law under the per se, strict scrutiny approach).
41. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also Ernst, supra note
30, at 58; Murray & Spence, supra note 39, at 76-77.
42. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Murray & Spence, supra note 39, at 76-77.
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or the Pike test." The Pike decision itself set forth the balancing test, but then
analyzed the challenged law using a strict scrutiny, per se approach. Subsequent
cases that applied the Pike test have often focused on issues of discriminatory
purposes or effects-issues that arguably should be analyzed under the per se
test.44 Justice Souter has argued that the Court does not "balance" competing local
and interstate interests when it applies the Pike test:
Although this analysis of competing interests has sometimes been
called a "balancing test," it is not so much an open-ended weighing
of an ordinance's pros and cons, as an assessment of whether an
ordinance discriminates in practice or otherwise unjustifiably
operates to isolate a State's economy from the national common
market.45
Justice Scalia has also argued that the Pike test provides no guidance to judges on
how to balance competing local and national interests and likened the balancing to
"judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy. 46
B. Solid Waste Problems and Flow Control Solutions
There has been a significant increase in the amount of household
municipal solid waste ("MSW") since 19 6 0 . To address increasing amounts of
43. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
44. Pike, 397 U.S. at 145 (assuming the legitimacy of the asserted state interest,
but nevertheless concluding that "[elven where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate
local interest, this particular burden on commerce [requiring business operations to be
performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere] has been
declared to be virtually per se illegal"); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce
Clause, 27 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 43 n.271 (2003) (observing that Pike did not apply a
balancing test in assessing constitutionality of the challenged law, and that scholars have
questioned whether the Court actually applies a Pike balancing test).
45. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 423 (1994)
(Souter, J., dissenting); see also Michael A. Lawrence, Towards a More Coherent Dormant
Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 395, 428-
29 (1998) (discussing criticism of Pike balancing test by Justice Souter ); Donald Regan,
The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1092 (1986) ("Despite what the Court has said, it has not
been balancing.... In the central area of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence,
comprising what I shall call 'movement-of-goods' cases (Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. may be
taken as paradigmatic), the Court has been concerned exclusively with preventing states
from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism.").
46. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also Lawrence, supra note 45, at 427-29 (discussing criticism
of Pike balancing test by Justice Scalia, other justices, and commentators).
47. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") defines municipal solid
waste ("MSW") as nonhazardous household waste as well as some household hazardous
waste; "MSW-more commonly known as trash or garbage-consists of everyday items
such as product packaging, grass clippings, furniture, clothing, bottles, food scraps,
newspapers, appliances, paint, and batteries." See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MUNICIPAL
SOLID WASTE-BASIC FACTS, available at http://www.epa.gov/garbage/facts.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter EPA, BASIC FACTS]. In 1960, the average American
generated 2.7 pounds of MSW per day, for a total of 88.1 million tons; by the year 2003, the
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MSW, many local governments adopted comprehensive programs to recycle or
incinerate waste in addition to disposing it in landfills.4
More stringent federal legislation has also led many local governments to
adopt regulatory programs to manage MSW. 49 In the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), 50 as amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984 ("HSWA"),5' Congress gave state, regional, and local
governments the primary role in managing household MSW. Congress declared
that "the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be primarily the
function of state, regional, and local agencies .... ,52 At the same time, Congress
placed a greater burden on local governments to insure the safe disposal of MSW
by stating that "disposal of solid waste ... without careful planning and
management [was] a danger to human health and the environment. 53
HSWA required the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to issue
more stringent environmental rules for the operation of MSW landfills. 4 More
stringent federal landfill regulations caused many older landfills to close because
they could not afford to upgrade their facilities in order to comply with the new
regulations.5 5 New MSW landfills, which are more efficient at disposing waste, are
also larger and more expensive than the older landfills that they replaced.5 6 Lastly,
more expensive landfill costs encouraged governments to build new waste
incinerators or recycling facilities as substitutes.5 7
After HSWA took effect in the 1980s, many local governments either
built or financed a centralized waste management facility and then imposed "flow
control ordinances" to control all the MSW in the jurisdiction. The flow control
average American created about 4.5 pounds of MSW per day, for a total of 236.2 million
tons in 2003. Id.
48. See id. "Currently, in the United States, 30 percent of MSW is recovered and
recycled or composted, 14 percent is burned at combustion facilities, and the remaining 56
percent is disposed of in landfills." Id.
49. Ernst, supra note 30, at 53-54; Murray & Spence, supra note 39, at 74-75.
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
51. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4); see id. § 6941 (giving states and local governments
the primary role in managing nonhazardous waste); Murray & Spence, supra note 39, at 74.
53. Ernst, supra note 30, at 53 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(2)).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 6942(b); Murray & Spence, supra note 39, at 74. If states did not
adopt a Subtitle D permit program to enforce the EPA's rules, the EPA could enforce its
own criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 6945(c); Murray & Spence, supra note 39, at 74.
55. Jeff Bailey, Waste Yes, Want Not; Rumors of a Shortage of Dump Space
Were Greatly Exaggerated, N.Y. TmsMS, Aug. 12, 2005, at 1.
56. The number of landfills in the United States has decreased from 8000 in
1988 to 1767 in 2002, but the total capacity of landfills has remained relatively constant
because new landfills are much larger on average than older landfills. See EPA, BASIC
FACTS, supra note 47; Murray & Spence, supra note 39, at 74-75, 84. Larger landfills are
typically more expensive overall, but their cost of disposing a ton of waste is usually much
lower. Bailey, supra note 55, at 1 ("A 10,000-ton-a-year dump would cost $83 a ton to
operate, estimates Solid Waste Digest, while a 300,000-ton-a-year site's cost would be $14
a ton.").
57. Murray & Spence, supra note 39, at 84.
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ordinances were designed to provide governments with adequate revenues to pay
for expensive new landfills, recycling programs, or incinerators.58 Flow control
schemes often restricted both in-state and out-of-state waste firms by requiring all
generators or haulers of local waste to take it exclusively to designated facilities
for processing or disposal. 59 By 1994, more than twenty states had enacted statutes
authorizing local or regional flow control ordinances.60
C. Carbone: The Supreme Court Strikes Down a Flow Control Ordinance
In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,6 ' the Town of Clarkstown
("the Town") had enacted an ordinance that required all nonhazardous solid waste
within the Town to be deposited at the designated, privately owned transfer station
for processing, even if the waste was not originally generated within the Town.62
The ordinance imposed fines of up to $1000 and a maximum of fifteen days in jail
for any hauler who took MSW from the Town without first having it processed at
the station.63
Carbone operated a recycling facility in Clarkstown that accepted waste
from both within and outside the Town, including from out-of-state sources.M The
Town sued Carbone in New York state court after it discovered that Carbone was
shipping waste from its facility within the Town to out-of-state landfills without
having it processed first at the transfer station. The Town sought an injunction that
would require Carbone to ship waste to the town's facility. 65 The state courts held
that the ordinance did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.66
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the ordinance facially discriminated
against interstate commerce and was invalid under the per se standard because the
Town "hoard[ed] solid waste, and the demand to get rid of it, for the benefit of the
preferred processing facility., 67 Since the ordinance required Carbone to send the
nonrecyclable portion of any out-of-state waste to the transfer station at an
additional cost, the Court found that the "flow control ordinance drives up the cost
58. Ernst, supra note 30, at 53-54; Jason M. King, Note, Standing in Garbage:
Flow Control and the Problem of Consumer Standing, 32 GA. L. REv. 1227, 1227 (1998).
59. See Ernst, supra note 30, at 54; King, supra note 58, at 1228-29.
60. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 406 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
61. 511U.S. 383.
62. The Town entered a contract in which a private firm would build within the
town limits a solid waste transfer station to separate recyclable from nonrecyclable items
and operate the facility for five years, with the Town guaranteeing the firm a minimum
waste stream flow and a minimum tipping fee for the five years, when the Town would buy
the facility for one dollar. Id. at 386-87, 395-400 (appendix containing Town of
Clarkstown, Local Law No. 9 of the year 1990; a local law entitled, "Solid Waste
Transportation and Disposal"); Ernst, supra note 30, at 56.
63. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387.
64. Id. at 388-89.
65. Id. 388.
66. Id. at 388-89.
67. Id. at 390-92.
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for out-of-state interests to dispose of their solid waste., 68 Even for waste
originating in Clarkstown, the Court concluded that the ordinance discriminated by
"prevent[ing] everyone except the favored local operator from performing the
initial processing step. The ordinance thus deprives out-of-state businesses of
access to a local market. "69 The ordinance did not qualify for the necessity
exception to the per se rule because the Town had alternative, nondiscriminatory
methods to advance its legitimate interest in health and safety. Furthermore, the
Town's interest in providing sufficient revenue to amortize the cost of the facility
was an insufficient justification for the ordinance's overt discrimination against
out-of-state interests because "the town may subsidize the facility through general
taxes or municipal bonds."
7
'
Because it concluded that the law was invalid under the per se standard,
the majority did not analyze the ordinance under the Pike balancing test.72 Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion argued that the ordinance was not facially
discriminatory, but did conclude that the ordinance was unconstitutional under the
Pike test.73 Lower courts, including Judge Guirola, the Federal Magistrate who
originally decided NSWMA, have examined her concurring opinion for guidance in
applying the Pike test to flow control ordinances.74
D. The Mississippi Scheme
The Mississippi Regional Solid Waste Management Authority Act
permits local governments to form regional waste management authorities. 7 In
1992, some cities and counties formed the Authority, and in 1997 they built a
regional landfill.76 The landfill attracted less waste than was necessary to operate
profitably. Consequently, in 2002, six cities and counties enacted separate flow
control ordinances requiring that all solid waste collected within these six
Members' territories be disposed of at the Authority's landfill or transfer stations.77
After enactment of the ordinances, the three primary plaintiffs, National
Solid Waste Management Association (a trade association that does not ship
waste), BFI Waste Systems of Mississippi, L.L.C. ("BET") and Waste Management
of Mississippi, Inc. ("Waste Management") filed suit against the Authority and its
68. Id. at 389.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 392-93.
71. Id. at 393-94.
72. Id. at 390 ("As we find that the ordinance discriminates against interstate
commerce, we need not resort to the Pike test.").
73. See id. at 401-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74. E.g., Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n. v. Pine Belt Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 261 F. Supp. 2d 644, 650-51 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (Guirola, Magistrate Judge), rev 'd on
other grounds, 389 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 332 (2005).
75. Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 17-17-301 through 17-17-349 (2005).
76. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 389 F.3d at 494.
77. In 2002, the Authority was made up of three counties (Covington, Jones, and
Perry) and three cities (Petral, Laurel, and Hattiesburg). Id. at 495. Each ordinance provided
that noncompliance with the flow control rule would constitute a misdemeanor. Id.
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Members under the dormant Commerce Clause. 78 Federal Magistrate Judge
Guirola decided that the six ordinances were unconstitutional under both the per se
test and the Pike test and permanently enjoined their enforcement.79 On appeal,
however, the Fifth Circuit sua sponte raised the issue of whether the plaintiffs met
the "zone of interests" test.80
II. STANDING
All plaintiffs in federal courts must establish standing to sue. First, there
are constitutional standing requirements under Article II.81 Additionally, the Court
has self-imposed nonconstitutional "prudential" limits on standing to avoid suits
that raise policy concerns about the appropriateness of federal judicial resolution
of a case. s 2
A. Constitutional Standing
The Constitution does not contain express standing requirements. The
Supreme Court, however, has interpreted Article 11183 of the Constitution to limit
suits in federal courts to plaintiffs who can demonstrate that they have:
(1) ... suffered "an injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
78. Id. They sued using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Id.
79. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass 'n, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 644-52. After the district
court judge originally assigned to the case recused himself, Federal Magistrate Judge
Guirola was accepted by all the parties to decide the case. Nat 'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass 'n,
389 F.3d at 496.
80. Nat 'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass 'n, 389 F.3d at 497-98; see also Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000) ("[W]e have an
obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset of the
litigation.").
81. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
82. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("Standing doctrine embraces
several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the
general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring
adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked." (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982))); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (stating that a court may deny standing if a
suit would raise "general prudential concerns 'about the proper-and properly limited-role
of the courts in a democratic society' . . . Thus, we have declined to grant standing where
the harm asserted amounts only to a generalized grievance shared by a large number of
citizens in a substantially equal measure" (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975)); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?,
35 ENvTL. L. 1, 21-22, 28 (2005).
83. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases
[and] Controversies.").
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speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision. 4
Plaintiffs have the burden of meeting all three factors.8 5 The Fifth Circuit held that
the plaintiffs in NSWMA met this three-part standing test.
8 6
B. The Prudential "Zone of Interests" Requirement
In addition to mandatory constitutional standing requirements, federal
courts have "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction."87 Courts use nonconstitutional "prudential" limitations on standing to
decline cases involving generalized grievances that are better suited to resolution
by the political branches of government. These prudential limitations serve the
general rule that third parties may not raise another person's legal rights, absent
special circumstances.8 8 The goal of the prudential standing requirements is to
determine whether the plaintiff "is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of
the dispute and the exercise of the court's remedial powers."8 9
To insure a plaintiff has an appropriate statutory or constitutional interest
in a suit, "a plaintiffs suit must fall within the 'zone of interests' protected by the
relevant statutory or constitutional provision." 90 Most "zone of interests" cases are
concerned with whether Congress intended to allow or prohibit certain types of
statutory suits pursuant to the APA. 9'
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp
92
("Data Processing"), the Court first required plaintiffs suing under the APA to
demonstrate that their suit is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
84. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); see also Mank, supra note 82, at 22; Robert V.
Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-Harmonizing Environmental and Constitutional
Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 827 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of
Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article 111, 91 MiCH. L. REv. 163, 170-75 (1992).
85. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 ("The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears
the burden of establishing these elements.").
86. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Pine Belt Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
389 F.3d 491, 498 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[P]laintiffs have an injury (higher operating costs) that
is traceable to the ordinances enacted by defendants and which would be remedied if we
rule that the ordinances are unconstitutional."), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 332 (2005).
87. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162-63
(1997) (discussing prudential limitations on standing); Mank, supra note 82, at 21-22, 28
(same).
88. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (discussing
prudential standing doctrine); Mank, supra note 82, at 21-22, 28.
89. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 n.8 (1986) (citing
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)).
90. Mank, supra note 82, at 28; see also Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162-63 (describing
the zone of interest standard as a prudential limitation rather than a mandatory constitutional
requirement).
91. See infra notes 104, 106 and accompanying text.
92. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."93 Justice
Douglas' opinion suggested that he added the term "constitutional guarantee" to
the "zone of interests" test as a way to include a broader range of noneconomic
interests. He stated:
A person or a family may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment
values sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause .... We
mention these noneconomic values to emphasize that standing may
stem from them as well as from the economic injury in which
petitioners rely here. 94
Responding to Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, which argued that
the majority's "zone of interests" test implicitly examined the merits of the case,95
Justice Douglas in Data Processing emphasized that the "zone of interests" test
does not look at the merits, but is a threshold determination. 96 Rejecting the legal
right or legal interest test, which did require an examination of the merits of a case,
the Data Processing Court stated that the "zone of interests" test was intended to
make standing a threshold jurisdictional issue separate from the merits of a case.
97
After deciding the standing issues in the case, the Data Processing Court refused
to address the merits and remanded that issue to the lower court.98
In Data Processing, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, dissented
from the adoption of the "zone of interests" test.99 First, Justice Brennan criticized
the majority for failing to explain or defime when a plaintiff meets the "zone of
interests" test, which is a problem that continues today. 1°° Additionally, he argued
93. Id. at 153 (emphasis added); William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone,
Tilting the Field.- Zone of Interests and Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear,
49 ADmiN. L. REV. 763, 778-79 (1997) ("The 'zone of interests' test was first articulated in
Association of Data Processing."); Mank, supra note 82, at 23.
94. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154.
95. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
96. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, 156, 158 (emphasizing that the
standing and "zone of interests" tests do not look to the merits of a case); William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 234 (1988).
97. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153 ("The 'legal interest' test goes to the
merits. The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the 'case' or
'controversy' test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.").
98. Id. at 157-58 ("Whether anything in the Bank Service Corporation Act or the
National Bank Act gives petitioners a 'legal interest' that protects them against violations of
those Acts, and whether the actions of respondents did in fact violate either of those Acts,
are questions which go to the merits and remain to be decided below."); Fletcher, supra note
96, at 234.
99. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 167-78 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting);
Sanford A. Church, Note, A Defense of the "Zone of Interests" Standing Test, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 447, 456-57 (discussing Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Data Processing).
100. Justice Brennan wrote:
What precisely must a plaintiff do to establish that 'the interest sought to
be protected ... is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
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that the "zone of interests" test confused the issue of standing with whether
Congress intended an issue to be reviewable and with the merits of a case.' 0'
Accordingly, he argued that the Court should abandon the murky "zone of
interests" test and simply use constitutional standing criteria. 102
C. Should the "Zone of Interests" Test Apply to Constitutional Cases?
1. Clarke: No Zone of Interests for Constitutional Cases
In Clarke, the Court in 1987 stated that "[t]he principal cases in which the
'zone of interest' test has been applied are those involving claims under the APA,
and the test is most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of § 702 [of the
APA].' °3 According to the Clarke court, the APA normally presumes the
availability of judicial review, but that presumption can be "overcome whenever
the congressional intent to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernible in the
statutory scheme. ' ' 1°4 The Clarke Court stated that the main purpose of the "zone
of interests" test is to bar suits where it is clear that Congress intended to preclude
judicial review. 10 5 In APA or other federal statutory cases, federal courts use the
zone of interests standard to determine whether Congress either explicitly or
implicitly imposed standing restrictions on particular plaintiffs or overrode
possible zone of interests limits by, for example, providing an express private right
of action. 106 In determining when Congress intended to preclude judicial review,
Justice White stated that courts should apply a liberal approach to the "zone of
interests" test that would allow standing unless there is strong evidence that
Congress intended to bar a suit or a plaintiff has interests that are "marginal[]" to
or "inconsistent" with the statute. 1
07
or regulated by the statute'? How specific an 'interest' must he advance?
Will a broad, general claim, such as competitive interest, suffice, or must
he identify a specific legally protected interest? When, too, is his interest
'arguably' within the appropriate 'zone'? Does a mere allegation that it
falls there suffice?
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting); see also Church,
supra note 99, at 456.
101. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting).
102. Id. at 178; Church, supra note 99, at 456.
103. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 395, 400 n.16 (1987)
(discussing the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000)); Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 GEO.
L.J. 317, 318, 327-28 (2004) (observing that most, but not all, of the Court's zone of
interests cases have involved the APA).
104. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399 (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Insts., 467 U.S.
340, 351 (1984)).
105. Id. at 395-401; Siegel, supra note 103, at 325-26.
106. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162-66 (1997) (holding that "unlike their
constitutional counterparts, [prudential limits on standing] can be modified or abrogated by
Congress," and concluding that a citizen suit provision abrogated the zone of interests
limitation); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Mank, supra note 82, at 28, 78.
107. As the Court explained:
The "zone of interest" test is a guide for deciding whether, in view of
Congress' evident intent to make agency action presumptively
reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a
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The Clarke Court appeared to question Data Processing's statement that
constitutional guarantees are subject to the "zone of interests" test, stating:
While inquiries into reviewability or prudential standing in other
contexts may bear some resemblance to a "zone of interest" inquiry
under the APA, it is not a test of universal application. Data
Processing speaks of claims "arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question." We doubt, however, that it is possible to
formulate a single inquiry that governs all statutory and
constitutional claims. 10 8
Justice White implied that the Court had not applied the test in many non-APA
cases where it was theoretically applicable.10 9
The Court has decided on the merits only one constitutional case
involving the zone of interests. In Boston Stock Exchange, the plaintiffs were out-
of-state stock exchanges that challenged facially discriminatory taxation that taxed
out-of-state securities transactions more heavily than in-state transactions 110 The
Court, in an opinion by Justice White, stated in a footnote that the plaintiffs were
arguably within the zone of interests of the dormant Commerce Clause because the
"transfer tax indirectly infring[ed]" their ability to engage in interstate commerce
and thus appeared to include indirect beneficiaries within the dormant Commerce
Clause's zone of interests. "' The Clarke decision strongly implied that the Court
should not routinely apply that test in constitutional cases, stating that:
particular agency decision. In cases where the plaintiff is not itself the
subject of the contested regulatory action, the test denies a right of
review if the plaintiffs interests are so marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit. The
test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be
no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.
Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400 (footnote and internal citation omitted).
108. Id. at 400 n.16 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Justice White's
majority opinion acknowledged that the Court had "occasionally listed the 'zone of interest'
inquiry among general prudential considerations bearing on standing, and have on one
occasion conducted a 'zone of interest' inquiry in a case brought under the Commerce
Clause." Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso,
Standing to Sue: Transformations in Supreme Court Methodology, Doctrine and Results, 28
U. TOL. L. REv. 93, 145-46 & n.340 (1996).
109. See Fletcher, supra note 96, at 258 (stating "the Court after Data Processing
has often neglected the zone of interests," and citing Clarke as demonstrating that the Court
has limited the test mainly to APA cases).
110. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
11I. Id. at 320 n.3 (stating that the plaintiffs "are asserting their right under the
Commerce Clause to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminatory taxes on their
business and they allege that the transfer tax indirectly infringes on that right. Thus, they are
'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected.. . by the... constitutional guarantee
in question' (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970))).
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While the decision that there was standing in Boston Stock
Exchange was undoubtedly correct, the invocation of the "zone of
interest" test there should not be taken to mean that the standing
inquiry under whatever constitutional or statutory provision a
plaintiff asserts is the same as it would be if the "generous review
provisions" of the APA apply.1
1 2
Justice White's discussion of the "zone of interests" test in Part II of the
Clarke decision was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor, stated that the "respondent is well within the 'zone of
interest' as that test has been applied in our prior decisions," and, therefore, "I do
not join Part II of the Court's opinion, which, in my view, engages in a wholly
unnecessary exegesis on the 'zone of interest' test."" 3 Justice Scalia did not
participate in the Clarke case."1
4
2. Justice Scalia: Apply the Zone of Interests to Constitutional Cases
In 1992, Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Wyoming v.
Oklahoma,1 which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
argued that the "zone of interests" test should apply in dormant Commerce Clause
cases and more generally in all constitutional cases.116 The State of Wyoming
brought an action in the Supreme Court to enjoin the enforcement of an Oklahoma
statute that required Oklahoma electric utilities, which previously had exclusively
used less expensive Wyoming coal, to use at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined
coal. The Court concluded that Wyoming's loss of severance tax revenues was
sufficient to provide standing." 7 The Wyoming Court relied heavily on Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission," 8 which found standing in a
Commerce Clause suit by a state agency that did not grow or sell apples. The
agency, however, received assessments based on the volume of apples sold and
would potentially receive smaller assessments if restrictions on interstate
commerce reduced the interstate sale of Washington apples." 9 Justice White's
112. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16 (citing Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156);
Kelso & Kelso, supra note 108, at 145-46 & n.340.
113. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 409-10 (Stevens, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 409.
115. 502 U.S. 437 (1992). The case was brought within the Court's original
jurisdiction to settle disputes between states. See id.
116. Id. at 468-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Kelso & Kelso, supra note 108, at 146
n.340; King, supra note 58, at 1249.
117. Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 440-46; King, supra note 58, at 1249.
118. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
119. Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 448-50 ("That the commission was allowed to
proceed in Hunt necessarily supports Wyoming's standing against Oklahoma, where its
severance tax revenues are directly linked to the extraction and sale of coal and have been
demonstrably affected by the Act." (discussing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333, 341-45 (1977))). Justice Scalia argued that Hunt was inapposite because that
decision had not used the "zone of interests" test to determine whether the apple
commission had standing, but instead had used "associational standing" on the theory that
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majority opinion did not directly address the "zone of interests" test, which is not
surprising in view of his Clarke opinion's limitation of the test to APA cases. 1
20
In his Wyoming dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the zone of
interests should apply to constitutional cases, including dormant Commerce Clause
cases, and that the test is more stringent in constitutional cases than APA cases.1
2 1
Justice Scalia argued that Wyoming's interest in tax revenues failed to meet the
test because it was not directly related to the Clause's protection of interstate
commerce. He appeared to suggest that only direct beneficiaries of interstate
trade, such as the coal sellers themselves, are within the Clause's zone of interests,
but that indirect beneficiaries of that trade, such as Wyoming with its interest in
tax revenues, are not. He did not, however, offer a clear test for distinguishing
between direct and indirect beneficiaries or an explanation of why the test does not
reach indirect beneficiaries. 23 He failed to reconcile his approach with Boston
the commission represented the interests of its members, apple growers, and sellers who had
standing. Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 471 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
121. Justice Scalia wrote that:
The "zone-of-interests" formulation first appeared in cases brought
under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, see
Association of Data Processing.. . but we have subsequently made clear
that the same test similarly governs claims under the Constitution in
general, see, e.g., Valley Forge ... and under the negative Commerce
Clause in particular, see Boston Stock Exchange.... Indeed, we have
indicated that it is more strictly applied when a plaintiff is proceeding
under a "constitutional ... provision" instead of the "generous review
provisions of the APA."
Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n. 16).
122. Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 470-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Kelso & Kelso, supra
note 108, at 146 n.340; King, supra note 58, at 1249; see infra notes 123-25, 181, 206,
273-74 and accompanying text.
123. Justice Scalia argued that:
The coal companies, of course, would pass the zone-of-interests test. So
would Wyoming if it bought or sold coal, or otherwise directly
participated in the coal market. It would then be "asserting [its] right...
to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminat[ion]," Boston Stock
Exchange .... But Wyoming's right to collect taxes presents an entirely
different category of interest, only marginally related to the national
market/free trade foundation of our jurisprudence in this area; indeed, it
is in a sense positively antagonistic to that objective, since all state taxes,
even perfectly constitutional ones, burden interstate commerce by
reducing profit. Thus, when state taxes have been at issue in our prior
negative Commerce Clause cases they have been the object of the
plaintiffs challenge rather than the basis for his standing; and we have
looked upon the State's interest in tax collection as a value to be weighed
against the purposes of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Thus,
Wyoming's interest in this case falls far shorter of meeting the zone-of-
interests test than did that of the plaintiff postal union in Air Courier
Conference ... : Whereas the latter's interest in securing employment
for postal workers, although distinct from the statute's goal of providing
postal services to the citizenry, at least coincided with that goal a good
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Stock Exchange's holding that the plaintiffs' allegations that a New York transfer
tax "indirectly" affected their ability to engage in interstate commerce gave them
zone of interests standing, or with that Court's implication that indirect
beneficiaries are within the dormant Commerce Clause's zone of interests.
1 24
Indeed, the Wyoming majority's use of Hunt implied that indirect beneficiaries of
interstate trade, such as a state agency, can meet the prudential "zone of interests"
test, although the majority never explicitly addressed the test.
125
The clearest reason why Justice Scalia favors a strong "zone of interests"
test in addition to constitutional standing tests is simply to reduce the number of
constitutional cases. 26 He has generally supported a narrow view of standing
because he strongly favors leaving policy issues to the political branches of
government. 127 Five months after the Court decided Wyoming, Justice Scalia wrote
amount of the time, here the asserted interest (tax collection) and the
constitutional goal invoked to vindicate it (free trade) are antithetical.
Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 470-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Kelso & Kelso, supra note
108, at 146 n.340; King, supra note 58, at 1249; infra notes 181, 206, 273-74 and
accompanying text.
124. 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977) (stating that the plaintiffs "are asserting their
right under the Commerce Clause to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminatory
taxes on their business and they allege that the transfer tax indirectly infringes on that right.
Thus, they are 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected ... by the ...
constitutional guarantee in question"' (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970))); see supra notes 23, 110 and accompanying text; infra
notes 181, 206, 273-74 and accompanying text.
125. See King, supra note 58, at 1250 ("In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the state of
Wyoming was two steps removed from the Oklahoma statute-the statute regulated
Oklahoma utility companies, which then purchased less coal from mining companies in
Wyoming, which in turn impacted Wyoming's severance tax revenues. Wyoming
nevertheless satisfied the zone of interests test.").
126. Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 473 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In abandoning the zone-of-interests test, the Court abandons our chosen
means of giving expression, in the field of constitutional litigation, to the
principle that "the judicial remedy cannot encompass every conceivable
harm that can be traced to alleged wrongdoing." Associated General
Con., of Cal, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 US. 519, 536... (1983)....
When courts abolish such limitations and require, as our opinion does
today, nothing more than a showing of de facto causality, exposure to
liability becomes immeasurable and the scope of litigation endless. If
today's decision is adhered to, we can expect a sharp increase in state
against state Commerce Clause suits; and if its rejection of the zone-of-
interests test is applied logically, we can expect a sharp increase in all
constitutional litigation.
Id.
127. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-78 (1992)
(Scalia, J., majority and plurality opinions) (arguing standing is limited to plaintiffs who
have "concrete" injury because broader standing would threaten separation-of-powers in
violation of both Article III's limits on judicial power and Article II's exclusive grant of
executive authority to "faithfully execute" laws); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881
(1983) (favoring narrow approach to standing because standing doctrine was a "crucial and
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the majority opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, which adopted a generally
stricter approach to the three-part Article III standing test. 128 Ironically, in Lujan,
Justice Scalia's majority opinion concluded that the plaintiffs did not have
standing because they had essentially only an ideological interest in protecting
endangered species in foreign countries and did not allege any concrete injury to
themselves.'12 By contrast, in Wyoming, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion argued
that Wyoming could not sue because its economic interest in collecting tax
revenues was only indirectly related to the ideological imperative of the
Commerce Clause in protecting interstate commerce.1 30 Many commentators have
criticized Justice Scalia's narrow approach to standing for making it too difficult
for plaintiffs to meet standing requirements in cases involving the violation of
significant constitutional rights.'13
Although Justice Scalia lost the zone of interests battle in Wyoming, in
Bennett v. Spear, which involved standing under the APA and the Endangered
Species Act, 132 his opinion rejected Justice White's view that the "zone of
interests" test mainly applies to suits under the APA. By 1997, Justice White and
the four justices who had joined Part II of his Clarke majority opinion had retired
from the Court. 33 Justice Scalia stated that while Data Processing had "applied
the zone of interests test to suits under the APA, . . . later cases have applied it also
in suits not involving review of federal administrative action.. . . ,134 Furthermore,
he observed that prior decisions of the Court had "specifically listed [the zone of
interests test] among other prudential standing requirements of general
application,"'13 5 including constitutional claims. These issues were not at issue in
inseparable element" of separation-of-powers principles, and more restrictive standing rules
would limit judicial interference with the popularly elected legislative and executive
branches); Mank, supra note 82, at 29-40 (discussing Justice Scalia's view that separation
of powers principles limit standing).
128. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-78 (Scalia, J., majority and plurality opinions).
129. See id. at 562-67, 571-78; Mank, supra note 82, at 30-35.
130. See supra notes 121-25 and infra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
131. See generally Percival, supra note 84, at 847-50 (criticizing Justice Scalia's
view that separation of powers principles limit standing); Sunstein, supra note 84, at 163-
68, 200-36 (same).
132. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-72 (1997) (concluding the requirement
under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) that the Fish and Wildlife Service use "the best scientific data
available" and "consider[] the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of
specifying any particular area as critical habitat" gave plaintiffs standing to sue under the
statute's citizen suit provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)); id. at 172-79 (holding that plaintiffs
had standing under APA to challenge whether agencies violated § 7 of the ESA, which
requires, inter alia, that each agency "use the best scientific and commercial data available"
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2))); Mank, supra note 82, at 77-80.
133. Justice White retired in 1993, Justice Powell in 1987, Justice Brennan in
1990, Justice Marshall in 1991, and Justice Blackmun in 1994. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACTS 2006 at 53 (2006).
134. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163 (citing Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 449 (1991)
and Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977)).
135. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) and Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-
75 (1982)).
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Bennett; therefore, his views are dicta. Citing Clarke, Justice Scalia suggested that
the Court should more strictly apply the test in non-APA cases.
136
3. Problems with Applying the "Zone of Interests" Test to Constitutional
Cases
There are serious problems with applying the "zone of interests" test to
constitutional questions. Even in statutory cases, the Court has had serious
difficulties in defining the "zone of interests" test. In 1998, in its most recent major
zone of interests case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its "prior cases have
not stated a clear rule for determining when a plaintiffs interest is 'arguably
within the zone of interests' to be protected by a statute ... A 2004 article by
Professor Siegel on the "zone of interests" doctrine described it as "a mystery" and
the law in a "confused state."'' 38 Professor Siegel would change the "zone of
interests" test to a statutory standing requirement that presumes that plaintiffs
injured by agency action have standing unless Congress in a statute other than the
APA "prescribes a more restrictive role." 139 Under his statutory approach, there is
little sense in applying the "zone of interests" test to constitutional cases.
In 1996, Professors Kelso and Kelso questioned "what role remains for
the zone of interests test in constitutional cases."'140 In 1970, Data Processing's
inclusion of constitutional guarantees in the "zone of interests" test may have made
sense because the Court had not yet fully developed its Article III standing test. 141
The Court's current three-part test for constitutional standing is more stringent
than the "zone of interests" test used in Data Processing, and, therefore, there is
little reason to use the "zone of interests" test except in statutory cases.
42
Furthermore, the Court has decided only one constitutional case involving the zone
136. Id. ("We have made clear, however, that the breadth of the zone of interests
varies according to the provisions of law at issue, so that what comes within the zone of
interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative action under
the "'generous review provisions"' of the APA may not do so for other purposes." (citing
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16 (1987))).
137. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479,
488 (1998), superseded by statute, Credit Union Membership Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
219, § 2, 112 Stat. 913, 914-15 (1998) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1759(b), as recognized in
Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 271 F.3d 262 (2001)).
138. Siegel, supra note 103, at 317, 319; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 9, National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Pine Belt Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 389
F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 332 (2005) (No. 04-1333), 2005 WL
770660 [hereinafter Cert. Petition] (quoting Siegel, supra note 103, at 317, 319).
139. Siegel, supra note 103, at 319, 368.
140. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 108, at 146.
141. Id. at 144-46 ("Since Data Processing was decided in 1970, the Court has
tightened the Article III constitutional test by requiring a concrete injury caused by the
challenged conduct and redressable by the court .... As elaborated by Justice White, the
'not especially demanding' zone of interests test would appear to be far less demanding than
the current version of the injury-in-fact test that is now declared to be a constitutional
minimum.").
142. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 108, at 146.
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of interests on the merits, 143 and most of its zone of interests cases focus on
discerning congressional intent to allow or prohibit suits under a particular statute.
As a result, the "zone of interests" test is not helpful in addressing constitutional
challenges. 144 Professors Kelso and Kelso agreed with the Clarke Court and
concluded their discussion of the "zone of interests" test by observing that it would
be difficult to develop "a workable zone of interests analysis in constitutional cases
that would add coherence and consistency to the law."'
145
Justice Scalia is correct that a stringent "zone of interests" test would
decrease the number of constitutional suits. Nevertheless, federal courts should
vindicate the constitutional rights of those who meet the three-part constitutional
standing test unless there are prudential objections other than the "zone of
interests" test to bar the suit. 14 6 First, as Justice White argued in Clarke, it is
difficult to apply the "zone of interests" test to constitutional issues because of
their variety.' 47 Justice Scalia himself has described the Court's dormant
Commerce Clause cases and doctrine as confusing, and that increases the
difficulties in applying the zone of interests in such cases. 1
48
Second, suits under the dormant Commerce Clause usually promote the
Supreme Court's long-held view that federal courts should serve the Clause's
implicit goal of eliminating economic protectionism among states by removing
local barriers to interstate trade. Consequently, courts should liberally construe
standing requirements to encourage such suits as long as the plaintiff can meet
constitutional standing requirements. 49 Nevertheless, in Wyoming, Justice Scalia
argued that Wyoming did not meet the "zone of interests" test because state taxes
generally reduce interstate commerce. Justice Scalia failed to acknowledge that
Wyoming's indirect and parochial interest in collecting more taxes did in fact
promote the goals of the dormant Commerce Clause because invalidating the
Oklahoma law would generally promote interstate trade.'
50
143. See supra notes 23, 92, 104, 106 and accompanying text.
144. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 108, at 146.
145. Id. at 146 (discussing Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 395, 400
n.16 (1987)).
146. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004)
(stating that the Court must balance the duty to exercise jurisdiction in constitutional cases
against the duty not to address constitutional questions that are not necessary for resolution
in light of Article III and prudential standing doctrines).
147. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text; infra notes 270, 286 and
accompanying text.
148. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 536 n.33 (1983) (rejecting three different standing tests used by lower courts,
including "zone of interests" test, because "these labels may lead to contradictory and
inconsistent results," and instead adopting a multifactor standing test); C. Douglas Floyd,
Antitrust Victims Without Antitrust Remedies: The Narrowing of Standing in Private
Antitrust Actions, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1, 2-12, 19-26, 31-32, 36-50, 72 (1997) (discussing
the Associated General Contractors court's abandonment of the "zone of interests" test in
antitrust cases, its use of multifactor balancing test, and the importance of competitor or
noncompetitor status in determining antitrust standing).
149. See infra notes 268-89 and accompanying text.
150. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 469-70 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court should abolish the confusing "zone of interests" test
for constitutional cases. Courts should generally find that the plaintiff meets the
"zone of interests" test, if the plaintiffs suit challenges a law under the dormant
Commerce Clause and the suit will promote interstate commerce, even if the
plaintiff's interest is in intrastate trade or a parochial concern unrelated to interstate
trade. The plaintiff should have standing, unless the plaintiff fails to meet
constitutional standing requirements or there are other serious policy objections to
such a suit. Instead of the murky "zone of interests" test, courts may use other
prudential requirements such as the general prohibition against third-party suits or
generalized suits. These prudential requirements will stop suits by plaintiffs who
have only marginal interests in pursuing such suits and who may not adequately
represent the Clause's interest in removing local barriers to interstate trade.'51
D. Applying a Liberal Approach to the "Zone of Interests"
Even if the Court does not abolish it for constitutional cases, courts
should liberally construe the "zone of interests" test. Courts should generally allow
plaintiffs in dormant Commerce Clause cases who meet constitutional standing
requirements to also meet the test unless there are special concerns about whether
a particular plaintiff can represent the Clause's goal of removing barriers to
interstate trade. If a plaintiffs suit meets Article III standing and supports
interstate trade, the "zone of interests" test does not require the plaintiff to show
that it is involved in interstate trade. One commentator has argued that:
[T]he zone of interests test turns on the interests sought to be
protected by the lawsuit, not the harm suffered by the plaintiff. In
this regard, the zone of interests test is distinct from the injury-in-
fact requirement, which independently requires adequate harm to
the plaintiff to permit standing as a matter of constitutional law. i5 2
That same commentator also states:
This distinction [between the zone of interests test and the injury-in-
fact requirement] is suggested by the test's very name, as well as by
its formulation by the Supreme Court: "[The zone of interests test]
concerns ... the question whether the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant is arguably ... protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'
' 53
151. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("Standing doctrine embraces
several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the
general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring
adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches ...."); Mank, supra note 82, at 21-22, 28 (discussing the prudential bar against
third-party suits and suits alleging generalized grievances).
152. King, supra note 58, at 1251 (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
153. Id. at 1251 n.154 (emphasis added).
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1. Oregon Waste Systems and Carbone Focused on a Law's General
Harm to Interstate Commerce and Not on the Plaintiff's Trade
In dormant Commerce Clause cases, the Court has focused on the impact
of the challenged law on interstate markets in general, rather than any injury to the
plaintiff in the case. The Court has not usually required individual plaintiffs to
prove a law causes them specific harm or that invalidating it will increase their
interstate trade. 154 In Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental
Quality,15 5 the Court struck down a facially discriminatory Oregon law that
imposed a higher in-state disposal surcharge on waste generated outside the state
than waste generated in-state. 156 According to Professor Heinzerling, "In deciding
that the [Oregon] law was facially discriminatory ... the Court noted only that the
plaintiffs were involved in transporting or disposing of out-of-state waste. It did
not ask whether the surcharge had hurt the plaintiffs' business, or whether it had
generally reduced interstate shipments of waste."' 157 The Court stated that in facial
discrimination cases it did not examine the extent of a law's impact on interstate
commerce, but simply applied "the virtually per se rule of invalidity" and that
"[t]he State's burden ofjustification is so heavy that 'facial discrimination by itself
may be a fatal defect." ' 158 The majority rejected Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion, which it characterized as "argu[ing] that the $2.25 per ton
surcharge is so minimal in amount that it cannot be considered discriminatory,
even though the surcharge expressly applies only to waste generated in other
States." The majority quoted the Wyoming decision to demonstrate that the Court's
facial discrimination precedents "clearly establish that the degree of a differential
burden or charge on interstate commerce 'measures only the extent of the
discrimination' and 'is of no relevance to the determination whether a State has
discriminated against interstate commerce.""
') 59
Oregon Waste Systems implies that at least in facial or purposeful
discrimination cases a waste shipper should be able to file suit under the dormant
Commerce Clause to challenge a law without having to prove personal harm from
it or benefit from its invalidation. Similarly, in Carbone, the Court was more
concerned with potential injuries to hypothetical out-of-state firms that were not
parties in that case than the actual impact on the plaintiff, Carbone. 160 Accordingly,
154. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 217,
224-25; id. at 264-65.
155. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
156. Id. at 96-101.
157. Heinzerling, supra note 154, at 224-25; id. at 264-65.
158. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100-01 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 337 (1979)).
159. Id. at 100 n.4 (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992)).
160. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389 (1994)
(stating that the ordinance "deprive[d] out-of-state businesses of access to a local market"
(emphasis added)); id. at 392 (stating "[tihe essential vice in laws of this sort" is that "[o]ut-
of-state [processors] ... are deprived of access to local demand for their services"
(emphasis added)); id. (stating the ordinance "squelches competition in the waste-
processing service altogether, leaving no room for investment from outside"); see also Cert.
Petition, supra note 138, at 11-13; Heinzerling, supra note 154, at 264-67.
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an intrastate waste shipper whose economic interests are injured by a flow control
ordinance, thus meeting constitutional injury-in-fact requirements, should be able
to file a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to invalidate a facially or
purposefully discriminatory law. The plaintiff should have standing even if it
cannot prove that it will immediately benefit from ending discrimination against
interstate trade because the Court does not require plaintiffs to prove how they will
benefit from the invalidation of such a law.161
2. Tax and Rebate Cases Presume Harm to In-State Wholesalers
In dormant Commerce Clause cases involving taxes on out-of-state goods
or preferential rebates to favored in-state firms, the Supreme Court has presumed
in-state wholesalers have standing to challenge such laws. The plaintiff has
standing even if it was only indirectly affected by the tax or rebate by a possible
reduction in sales or a worsened competitive position. 162 First, in Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias,163 the Court held that in-state liquor wholesalers had standing to file a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a Hawaii law that exempted certain
alcohols produced in-state from liquor taxes. 16 The wholesalers could in theory
pass on to their customers any taxes on out-of-state liquor producers. Nevertheless,
the Court concluded that the wholesalers suffered economic injury both because
they were directly liable for the tax and because the tax harmed their competitive
position by raising the price of their imported goods relative to the exempted in-
state beverages. 165 Because of the tax's discriminatory purpose or effect, the Court
161. In discriminatory effects cases, a plaintiff should not have to allege personal
harm if a law has clear discriminatory effects under the per se test, but she might need to
show some personal harm under the Pike balancing test where the harm to interstate trade in
general is less obvious, perhaps necessitating a plaintiff to show personal harm. See supra
notes 29-46, 154-60 and accompanying text; infra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
162. Arguably, tax or rebate cases under the dormant Commerce Clause are
different than laws restricting trade, but the spirit of the tax or rebate cases is at least helpful
in understanding trade cases.
163. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
164. Hawaii imposed a twenty percent excise tax on all wholesale liquor sales, but
exempted fruit wine manufactured in Hawaii and okolehao, a brandy distilled from the root
of a shrub indigenous to Hawaii. Id. at 265-67. On the merits, the Court held that the law
was unconstitutional because it "had both the purpose and effect of discriminating in favor
of local products." Id. at 273.
165. The Court explained:
The State ... claim[s] ... that the wholesalers have no standing to
challenge the tax because they have shown no economic injury from the
claimed discriminatory tax. The wholesalers are, however, liable for the
tax. Although they may pass it on to their customers, and attempt to do
so, they must return the tax to the State whether or not their customers
pay their bills. Furthermore, even if the tax is completely and
successfully passed on, it increases the price of their products as
compared to the exempted beverages, and the wholesalers are surely
entitled to litigate whether the discriminatory tax has had an adverse
competitive impact on their business. The wholesalers plainly have
standing to challenge the tax in this Court.
Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
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presumed that the law had some negative effects on out-of state liquor sales and
declined to consider Hawaii's argument that the tax had almost no competitive
impact on the wholesalers because it affected only a small percentage of liquor.166
Although it did not directly address prudential standing, Bacchus clearly
concluded that standing is appropriate where an in-state firm's competitive
position is harmed by a local law that discriminates against interstate commerce.
The Court stated that "the wholesalers are surely entitled to litigate whether the
discriminatory tax has had an adverse competitive impact on their business."'
67
Similarly, because plaintiffs BFI and Waste Management alleged that extra costs
caused by the ordinances harmed their regional and national competitive positions,
the Fifth Circuit, in NSWM4, should have held that they met the "zone of interests"
test not only for a Pike challenge, but also for a per se challenge.
168
In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,169 two in-state milk wholesale
dealers 170 challenged a Massachusetts tax and subsidy scheme that required a
"premium payment" on all milk sold by licensed Massachusetts milk dealers to
state retailers, regardless of whether the milk was produced in state or out of state.
Massachusetts then distributed the revenue from the tax as a subsidy to in-state
dairy farmers. 171 Although it did not explicitly address standing, the Court
apparently assumed the dealers had standing because they paid the premium even
though the same fee applied to in-state or out-of-state milk, and the dealers might
have been able to pass the burden of the tax to retailers or consumers.' 72 The Court
rejected Massachusetts' argument "that since the Massachusetts milk dealers who
pay the order premiums are not competitors of the Massachusetts farmers, the
pricing order imposes no discriminatory burden on commerce."'' 73 The Court never
166. Id. at 267-71. The Court remanded to the Hawaii courts the issue of whether
the state must refund the taxes collected by the wholesalers, an issue that would require
analysis of the impact of the tax on the wholesalers. Id. at 276-77.
167. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
168. See Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Pine Belt Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 389 F.3d 491, 500-01 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding plaintiffs BFI and Waste
Management had met the prudential zone of interests standing test because the challenged
flow control ordinances allegedly increased their cost of doing business and thus harmed
their regional and national competitiveness), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 332 (2005).
169. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
170. The petitioner, West Lynn Creamery, Inc., was a milk dealer licensed to do
business in Massachusetts. Id. at 188. It purchased raw milk, which it processed, packaged,
and sold to wholesalers, retailers, and other milk dealers, including the second petitioner
LeComte's Dairy, Inc. About ninety-seven percent of the raw milk West Lynn purchased
was produced by out-of-state farmers. Id.
171. Id. at 188-91.
172. Id.
173. The Court stated:
This argument cannot withstand scrutiny. Is it possible to doubt that if
Massachusetts imposed a higher sales tax on milk produced in Maine
than milk produced in Massachusetts that the tax would be struck down,
in spite of the fact that the sales tax was imposed on consumers, and
consumers do not compete with dairy farmers? For over 150 years, our
cases have rightly concluded that the imposition of a differential burden
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addressed the extent to which the Massachusetts tax and subsidy scheme harmed
the milk dealers, but instead focused on the impact of the subsidy on out-of-state
dairies that were not parties to the suit. 1
74
Similarly, in NSWMA, BFI and Waste Management were sufficiently
harmed by the ordinances to serve as suitable plaintiffs on behalf of out-of-state
waste sites or haulers who did not sue. In Bacchus and West Lynn Creamery, the
Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs who were in-state wholesalers to bring dormant
Commerce Clause challenges because of possible and unsubstantiated impacts on
their competitive position even though only out-of-state interests were directly
affected. 17  The financial impact of the six ordinances on BFI and Waste
Management's regional and national contracts was clearer than the impact on the
in-state wholesalers in Bacchus and West Lynn Creamery. Because of these
impacts, the Fifth Circuit should have recognized that both plaintiffs met the "zone
of interests" test to challenge the ordinances under both the Pike and the per se
tests.
3. Intrastate Waste Firms Harmed by a Flow Control Ordinance Often
Have Sufficient Interest in Challenging the Law's Interstate
Discrimination
Under Article III, a plaintiff has to demonstrate an injury-in-fact that is
traceable to a challenged law and that is redressable by judicial action.' 76 Article
III standing requirements are sufficient to protect federal courts from nuisance
suits by marginal plaintiffs with no real stake in suing. In two per se challenges
under the dormant Commerce Clause, Oregon Waste Systems and Carbone, the
Court invalidated the discriminatory law based on its harm to interstate commerce
in general without considering whether it actually harmed the plaintiffs in that
case. 177 If a plaintiff in a per se challenge does not have to prove that a local law
actually harmed its interstate trade or would increase its future interstate trade,
then why should courts use a "zone of interests" test to limit suits to plaintiffs who
actually make interstate shipments of waste?
Intrastate waste firms that are directly regulated by and financially injured
by a flow control ordinance meet the three-part test for standing under Article III
on any part of the stream of commerce-from wholesaler to retailer to
consumer-is invalid, because a burden placed at any point will result in
a disadvantage to the out-of-state producer.
Id. at 202 (internal citations omitted).
174. Id. at 194 ("Like an ordinary tariff, the tax is thus effectively imposed only
on out-of-state products.").
175. Neither Bacchus nor West Lynn Creamery explicitly addressed prudential
standing, although the doctrine was applicable at the time of each decision. See id. at 196-
97; Bacchus Imps. Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); supra notes 163-75 and
accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
177. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992) ("Once a
state [law] is found to discriminate against out-of-state commerce, it is typically struck
down without further inquiry."); Cert. Petition, supra note 138, at 15-17; supra notes
61-73, 154-61 and accompanying text.
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and should not be denied the opportunity to facially challenge an ordinance
restricting both intrastate and interstate commerce under the dormant Commerce
Clause. These firms clearly have a genuine interest in invalidating such an
ordinance and thus are not the "marginal" plaintiffs that the Clarke Court sought to
exclude from suing under the "zone of interests" test. 178 A recent D.C. Circuit
decision stated that a competitor motivated by commercial interests normally
meets the "zone of interests" test if its interests are "congruent" with the statute
and its suit will advance the operation of the statute even if its underlying
motivations are different from the statute. 79 Intrastate firms are direct competitors
of the government or private facilities privileged by the ordinance. Furthermore,
intrastate firms often directly compete with interstate firms, and could enter
interstate markets if they succeed in invalidating an ordinance.
The better approach to serving the values of the dormant Commerce
Clause is to liberally construe standing requirements to allow any party adversely
affected by a restrictive local ordinance to challenge it if the party meets Article III
standing requirements. An additional zone of interests barrier would be appropriate
only if the suit will "hinder" the purposes of the Clause.1
8 0
Alternatively, if a local law indirectly harms an intrastate shipper's
interstate business or trade, perhaps by harming its interstate parent company, then
the shipper should meet the "zone of interests" test not only under Pike, but also
under the per se test. The Court supported this conclusion in Boston Stock
Exchange when it held that a transfer tax on regional stock exchanges that
"indirectly infring[ed]" on their interstate trade was sufficient to give them zone of
interests standing. 18 It makes little practical sense for a court to hold that a
plaintiff that ships a small amount of waste to an out-of-state location is within the
dormant Commerce Clause's zone of interests, but that two large Mississippi waste
companies that are significantly harmed by the ordinance are not within the zone
of interests to mount a per se challenge. The fact that the two waste companies are
subsidiaries of the two largest waste companies in the United States, companies
178. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987) (stating that
the "zone of interests test" seeks to preclude suits by "marginal" plaintiffs who lack any
genuine interest in filing suit).
179. The court explained its decision as follows:
Our cases have pointed out that a party need not share Congress' motives
in enacting a statute to be a suitable challenger to enforce it; "parties
motivated by commercial interests routinely satisfy the zone of interests
test," as "congruence of interests, rather than identity of interests, is the
benchmark." Amgen v. Smith, ... 357 F.3d 103, 108-09 (D.C. Cir.
2004). If there is reason to believe that a party's interest in statutory
enforcement will advance, rather than hinder, the operation of a statute,
the court can reasonably assume that Congress intended to permit the
suit.
Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 374 F.3d 1363, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per
curiam), modified on other grounds, 393 F.3d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
180. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text; infra notes 268-89 and
accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 23, 110, 150 and accompanying text; infra notes 206, 273-
74 and accompanying text.
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whose national and regional contracts are adversely affected by the additional
costs imposed by the laws, further demonstrates the impracticality of this
holding.
8 2
III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S "ZONE OF INTERESTS" ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit in NSWMA rejected decisions in other circuits that
recognized that intrastate waste firms may meet the "zone of interests" test for the
dormant Commerce Clause to challenge a flow control ordinance discriminating
against both intrastate and interstate trade.18 3 The Fifth Circuit analyzed the "zone
of interests" test separately for the plaintiffs' per se and Pike challenges without
acknowledging the lack of a clear line between the two tests.1
8 4
The Fifth Circuit should have followed the "spirit" of Clarke, which
broadly interpreted which plaintiffs have sufficient interests to meet the "zone of
interests" test for the APA. The Fifth Circuit should have recognized that the
plaintiffs had sufficient interest in challenging the six ordinances' discrimination
against interstate commerce despite shipping only within the state. The plaintiffs
are "reliable," are directly regulated by the ordinances, are clearly "competitors" of
the defendant Authority and its members, and could ship the waste to interstate
markets if the court had struck down the six ordinances. 8 5 Additionally, the
plaintiffs BFI and Waste Management have more than a "marginal" interest in
interstate trade because they are each subsidiaries of national firms whose regional
and national contracts are directly affected by the higher costs from the
ordinances.1 86 The ordinances increased their parent companies' costs and affected
their regional and national competitiveness; consequently, the impact of the
ordinances on the plaintiffs' related interstate trade in waste should be enough to
give them standing not only to bring a Pike challenge, as the Fifth Circuit found,
but also a per se challenge.1
8 7
A. Facially Discriminatory
The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the prudential
"zone of interests" standing requirements for a per se, facial challenge to the
ordinances because they did not send any waste to out-of-state sites.' 8 In a
182. See supra notes 7, 10-11 and accompanying text; infra notes 186-87, 202-
03, 242 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 189, 191 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text; infra notes 187, 248-57 and
accompanying text.
185. See Cert. Petition, supra note 138, at 12-13 (arguing that the plaintiffs BFI
and Waste Management were "reliable" plaintiffs as defined by the Supreme Court in
Clarke).
186. See supra notes 10, 182, 185 and accompanying text; infra notes 202-03,
242 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 10, 182, 185 and accompanying text; infra notes, 202--03,
242 and accompanying text.
188. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Pine Belt Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
389 F.3d 491, 499-500 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 332 (2005).
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footnote, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged "that our conclusion that plaintiffs do not
meet the prudential standing requirement differs from that in two opinions from
our sister circuits."18 9 In On the Green Apartments L.L.C. v. City of Tacoma, 90 the
Ninth Circuit held that an in-state waste hauler could meet the "zone of interests"
test for the dormant Commerce Clause. The Fifth Circuit argued that On the
Green's holding was flawed because the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that
an in-state shipper could not win a challenge on the merits.191
Its criticism of On the Green's reasoning is itself flawed if the Fifth
Circuit meant that a plaintiff cannot have standing if a court eventually rules
against it on the merits because standing is a threshold issue that a court should
We conclude that plaintiffs' injury does not fall within the zone of
interests to be protected by the dormant Commerce Clause with respect
to ordinances that are alleged to facially discriminate against out-of-state
economic interests. The flow control ordinances mandate that any waste
generated within the Region be transported to the Authority's landfill or
transfer stations. In effect, the ordinances prohibit the export of any
waste outside of the Region, including out of state. However, these
plaintiffs do not ship (and, so far as the record shows, have never
shipped) any waste they collect within the Region to any location outside
of Mississippi .... In sum, plaintiffs' injury is not related to any out-of-
state characteristic of their business. Thus, plaintiffs do not have
standing to challenge the ordinances on the basis of a claim that they are
facially discriminatory against out-of-state interests. As such, we express
no opinion about whether the ordinances would pass the facially
discriminatory test if challenged by a proper plaintiff.
Id. (footnotes omitted). BFI ships waste from a new member of the Authority, Stone
County, to Alabama. The Fifth Circuit declined to consider BFI's shipments to Alabama
because Stone County was not a party to the suit, the contract between Stone County and
the Authority had not been finalized at the time of the trial, and Stone County had not yet
adopted a flow control ordinance. Id. at 499 n. 14.
189. Id. at 500 n.16.
190. 241 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2001).
191. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 389 F.3d at 500 n. 16.
In On the Green, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the plaintiff
alleged only an intrastate burden, the "Commerce Clause [was] not at all
implicated." We fail to see how the plaintiffs alleged injury could even
arguably fall within the zone of interests to be protected by the dormant
Commerce Clause when the court concluded that the case did not even
implicate the Commerce Clause. Further, the Ninth Circuit seems to
have confused the redressability requirement for constitutional standing
with the zone of interests test. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
plaintiffs injury was "related to the purposes underlying the Commerce
Clause" because the "injury would be remedied if [the plaintiff] could
take its garbage outside the city." The fact that an injury would be
remedied if the ordinance was struck down does not mean that the
grievance falls within the zone of interests to be protected by the
dormant Commerce Clause, particularly when there was no allegation of
any interstate burden. Under the Ninth Circuit's rationale in On the
Green, the zone of interest test and the redressability requirement would
essentially be the same.
Id (internal citations omitted).
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decide before it rules on the merits. 92 The Fifth Circuit itself has warned that
courts should not consider the merits of a case when deciding standing.1 93 For
instance, in Clarke, the Supreme Court held that the respondent trade association
was arguably within the zone of interests protected by the statute at issue and thus
had standing, before the Court ultimately ruled against the respondent on the
merits. 1
94
In Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton,195 the First Circuit
held that an in-state shipper economically harmed by an ordinance that
discriminates against its intrastate trade met the "zone of interests" test to
challenge the law's discrimination against interstate commerce under the dormant
192. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) ("The standing inquiry
focuses on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring this suit, ... although that
inquiry 'often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted,' .... " (internal citation
omitted)); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) ("The requirement
of standing 'focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not
on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated."' (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) ("The rules of standing ... are
threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention."); Flast, 392 U.S. at 99
("[T]he fundamental aspect of standing focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint
before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated."); CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 13 FED. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURIS. § 3531 n.2 (2d ed.
1991 & Supp. 2005). It is true that the issues involved in standing and those involved in the
merits may sometimes overlap, but standing is still a separate, threshold issue. See Warth,
422 U.S. at 500 ("Although standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiffs
contention that particular conduct is illegal ... it often turns on the nature and source of the
claim asserted." (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 99)). But see Fletcher, supra note 96, at 229
(acknowledging doctrine treating standing as threshold issue decided before merits, but
arguing standing "should be seen as a question of substantive law, answerable by reference
to the statutory and constitutional provision whose protection is invoked"); Matthew
Porterfield, Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative: The (Con)fusion of APA
Standing and the Merits Under NEPA, 19 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 157, 157-58 (1995)
(acknowledging doctrine treating standing as threshold issue decided before merits, but
arguing "[n]onetheless, there has always been some overlap between standing and the
merits").
193. See, e.g., Grant ex rel. Family Eldercare v. Gilbert, 324 F.3d 383, 387 (5th
Cir. 2003) (stating that the district court's "decision to address the merits as part of the
standing inquiry was premature"); O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 685 (5th Cir. 1982)
("Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the standing doctrine is that it focuses on the
particular plaintiff seeking to bring his claim before the federal court, not on the issues or
merits of the case.").
194. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 401-04 (1987) (holding that the
respondent met zone of interests standing); id. 404-08 (denying respondent's challenge on
the merits); Cert. Petition, supra note 138, at 9 n.4 (observing that Clarke recognized that
the plaintiffs met the "zone of interests" test, but had ruled against them on merits). But see
Porterfield, supra note 192, at 157-58 (arguing the "zone of interests" test requires some
consideration of merits even though standing is theoretically a threshold issue that is
decided before the merits).
195. 175 F.3d 178 (1st Cir. 1999).
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Commerce Clause. 196 Disagreeing with Houlton, the Fifth Circuit argued that the
dormant Commerce Clause only protects interstate trade, not "any economic
interests," such as in-state trade.197 The Fifth Circuit failed to acknowledge that an
intrastate shipper's suit may advance the interests of the dormant Commerce
Clause in protecting interstate commerce from discrimination. 98 If it had
addressed the merits of whether the ordinances violated the per se test, the Fifth
Circuit clearly would have had to affirm Judge Guirola's conclusion that the
ordinances facially discriminated against interstate waste haulers and facilities. 199
Just before this Article was published, the Sixth Circuit explicitly
disagreed with NSWMA4's requirement that a plaintiff must actually ship waste
across state lines to satisfy the prudential standing test. In National Solid Wastes
Management Ass 'n v. Daviess County, the Sixth Circuit stated in a footnote:
The fact that Plaintiff has not shown that waste generated within
Daviess County has actually crossed state lines is of no import with
respect to prudential standing; the Commerce Clause protects the
right to contract across state lines, not just the actual movement of
goods or services across state lines .... While one other circuit has
seemingly required such actual movement, see [NSWMA], the law
of this Court recognizes prudential standing where the plaintiff
seeks to protect its right to contract for or purchase out-of-state
goods or services. 200
The Sixth Circuit's approach to prudential standing is not as liberal as the First and
Ninth Circuits', but this recent decision does demonstrate that the Fifth Circuit's
requirement that a plaintiff actually ship goods across state lines is too narrow.
B. Prudential Standing and the Pike Test
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs met the "zone of interests"
test to challenge the ordinances as to their burden on interstate commerce under
196. In Houlton, the First Circuit concluded that the plaintiff met the zone of
interests requirement because the plaintiff had "assert[ed] his own economic interests under
the Commerce Clause-a constitutional provision specifically targeted to protect those
interests .... 175 F.3d at 183. On the merits, the First Circuit held that a flow control
ordinance requiring all waste to go to a single facility did not violate the Clause because the
town had used a competitive bidding process open to out-of-state contractors. Id. at 188;
Ernst, supra note 30, at 60-61.
197. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Pine Belt Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
389 F.3d 491, 500 n.16 (5th Cir. 2004) ("However, the rationale behind the dormant
Commerce Clause is to protect against local economic protectionism at the expense of out-
of-state interests, Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1682, not to protect any economic interests. In our
opinion, the Houlton court simply viewed too broadly the zone of interests protected by the
dormant Commerce Clause."), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 332 (2005).
198. See supra notes 7, 10-11, 175, 177-79, 181-82, 185-87 and accompanying
text; infra notes 205-10, 215, 219, 229-30, 234-47 and accompanying text.
199. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Pine Belt Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
261 F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (Guirola, Magistrate Judge), rev'd on other
grounds, 389 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 332 (2005).
200. 434 F.3d 898, 902 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2006).
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the Pike test. In support of this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[a]n
allegation that the plaintiff is involved in interstate commerce and that the
plaintiffs interstate commerce is burdened by the ordinance in question is
sufficient to satisfy the zone of interests test with respect to ordinances that
assertedly impose an excessive burden on interstate commerce., 20' Although the
plaintiffs did not ship any waste from the six members to out-of-state sites, the
Fifth Circuit determined that plaintiffs BF1 and Waste Management are
subsidiaries of national waste companies that "are engaged in interstate commerce,
and their interstate commerce is allegedly burdened by the ordinances., 20 2 The
Fifth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to meet the
"zone of interests" test under the Pike standard by alleging that the higher costs
imposed by the Mississippi flow control ordinance would burden their ability to
conduct interstate commerce by raising the cost of their national and regional
contracts.20 3 The Fifth Circuit should have allowed the plaintiffs to bring a per se
challenge as well because invalidating the ordinances under the per se test would
204also positively affect the plaintiffs' regional and national contracts.
C. Critique of the Fifth Circuit's Standing Analysis
Following the spirit of Clarke's broad interpretation of which plaintiffs
meet the "zone of interests" test for the APA, an intrastate waste firm that meets
Article III standing requirements should have standing to challenge a flow control
ordinance that regulates it and harms its business. Such a firm is a "reliable"
plaintiff that should meet the "zone of interests" test because it shares the same
economic interests as interstate firms in striking down the law, it competes with
the government-favored waste facilities, and it could enter interstate markets if the
201. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 389 F.3d at 500.
202. Id. at 501. In their Petition for Certiorari, pursuant to Rule 29.6, the
petitioners explained their corporate ownership as follows:
Waste Management of Mississippi, Inc., is wholly owned by Waste
Management Holdings, Inc., which in turn is wholly owned by Waste
Management, Inc. BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc., is wholly
owned by Browning-Ferris Industries LLC. The sole member of BFI
Waste Systems of Mississippi, LLC, is Allied Waste North America, Inc.
Cert. Petition, supra note 138, at ii.
203. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 389 F.3d at 501.
Plaintiffs argue that, because the flow control ordinances will raise their
costs to service these national and regional contracts which include
customer locations within the Region, they will be relatively less
competitive within the Region and that this impact on these contracts
will extend to the portion of the contracts covering customer locations
outside of Mississippi. The ordinances thus allegedly burden plaintiffs'
interstate commerce. Plaintiffs therefore are arguably within the
appropriate zone of interests and, therefore, have standing to challenge
whether the ordinances excessively burden interstate commerce.
Id. (footnote omitted).
204. See supra notes 7, 10-11, 186-87, 202-03 and accompanying text; infra
note 242 and accompanying text.
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court invalidates the law's discriminatory provisions. 2 5 Alternatively, the Court in
Boston Stock Exchange held that a transfer tax on regional stock exchanges that
"indirectly infring[ed]" on their interstate trade was sufficient to give them zone of
interests standing.2 °6 Therefore, intrastate firms whose intrastate trade affects
interstate trade, or who engage in related interstate trade that is at least indirectly
affected by restrictions on interstate trade, should meet the "zone of interests" test
for raising both Pike or per se challenges.
1. Other Circuits Have Applied a Less Demanding "Zone of Interests"
Test
a. First Circuit-Houlton
The First and Ninth Circuit, and possibly the Eighth Circuit,20 7 have
appropriately concluded that intrastate waste firms directly regulated by a flow
control ordinance are within the zone of interests to challenge the ordinance's
constitutionality under the dormant Commerce Clause. In Houlton, the First
Circuit held that a local waste hauler had zone of interests standing to argue that a
flow control ordinance discriminated against interstate commerce. The First
Circuit explained: "As a classic plaintiff asserting his own economic interests
under the Commerce Clause-a constitutional provision specifically targeted to
protect those interests-[plaintiff] avoids any concerns relative ... to the zone of• ,208 ,
interests requirement. The court stated that the plaintiff s "claim to standing is
not damaged because he failed to allege that he hauled garbage out-of-state or
planned to do so. In Commerce Clause jurisprudence, cognizable injury is not
restricted to those members of the affected class against whom states or their
political subdivisions ultimately discriminate., 20 9 It concluded: "Thus, an in-state
business which meets constitutional and prudential requirements due to the direct
or indirect effects of a law purported to violate the dormant Commerce Clause has
205. See Cert. Petition, supra note 138, at 10 (arguing that plaintiffs BFI and
Waste Management were "reliable" plaintiffs as defined by Supreme Court in Clarke);
infra notes 229-48 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 23, 110, 181 and accompanying text; infra notes 273-74 and
accompanying text.
207. See Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d
1372, 1376-79 (8th Cir. 1997) (implying that all the plaintiffs, apparently including some
intrastate firms, had prudential standing, and stating there was "no question that the
Oehrleins plaintiffs, that is, various waste haulers and processors, have standing.... [W]e
see no prudential barriers to standing for the Oehrleins plaintiffs"); Randy's Sanitation, Inc.
v. Wright County, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1024 (D. Minn. 1999) (stating that "the Oehrleins
court must have been satisfied that each plaintiff had standing to challenge a restriction on
out-of-state transportation of waste, regardless of whether it actively engaged in the activity
or not" (emphasis added)); Cert. Petition, supra note 138, at 10 (arguing that the
Oehrleins court recognized zone of interests standing for intrastate shippers); see also
Houlton Citizens' Coal. v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 183 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing
Oehrleins as recognizing standing for in-state waste haulers).
208. Houlton, 175 F.3d at 183.
209. Id. (citing General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 286 (1997)).
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standing to challenge that law.' ' O If a discriminatory law harms both intrastate and
interstate shippers, the intrastate shipper has the same economic interests as the
interstate shipper and thus can serve the interests of the dormant Commerce Clause
equally well.
b. Ninth Circuit-On the Green
In On the Green Apartments, the plaintiff, On the Green Apartments,
L.L.C. ("On the Green"), operated a 545-unit residential apartment complex in the
City of Tacoma, Washington ("the City"). 21 ' On the Green sought to haul the
garbage generated by its residents to in-state landfills outside Tacoma. By
ordinance, however, Tacoma required that all businesses and residents have their
waste collected by its Solid Waste Utility.21 2 Tacoma also required that all waste,
whether collected by the City or self-hauled, must be deposited at the City's public
disposal area.213 In its dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the ordinance, On
the Green alleged that self-hauling and disposing of its waste at in-state landfills
would save it money compared to city fees.
214
The Ninth Circuit held that On the Green met Article III standing because
its alleged financial injury would be remedied if the court voided the ordinance. 215
In a similar prior case, however, Individuals for Responsible Government, Inc. v.
Washoe County ("Washoe"), the Circuit had denied standing under the "zone of
interests" test to residential and commercial waste generators.21 6 In that prior case,
the plaintiffs had previously self-hauled to both in-state and out-of-state landfills,
but an ordinance required them to have their garbage collected by an exclusive
franchisee of the local government. The Circuit found that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because:
[T]heir injury-being forced to pay for unwanted garbage
services-was "not even marginally related to the purpose[]
underlying the dormant Commerce Clause," that is, "to limit the
power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade." ...
We relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiffs' injury would
continue even if the waste collector used only landfills outside the
state.27
Following its Washoe precedent, the Ninth Circuit in On the Green held
that the plaintiffs challenge to Tacoma's requirement that it use the City's
210. Id. (citing General Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 286-87).
211. On the Green Apartments L.L.C. v. City of Tacoma, 241 F.3d 1235, 1237
(9th Cir. 2001).
212. Id. The ordinance did allow certain classes of residents and businesses to
petition the City for a special permit to self-haul their waste, but Tacoma denied On the
Green's request to self-haul. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff met the
ordinance's standards for self-hauling rejecting the City's denial of a permit. Id. at 1240-41.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1237-38.
215. Id.
216. 110 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1997).
217. On the Green, 241 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Washoe, 110 F.3d at 703-04).
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exclusive waste hauler failed to meet the "zone of interests" test.218 By contrast,
the Ninth Circuit in On the Green held that the plaintiff's alternative challenge to
Tacoma's requirement that self-haulers tip their garbage at the City's dump met
the "zone of interests" test because invalidating the requirement of tipping at the
City's dump would remedy the alleged financial harm.21
Addressing the merits, the Ninth Circuit concluded that On the Green's
allegation that it would dump at other in-state landfills was insufficient to
implicate the dormant Commerce Clause.220 Although the Tacoma ordinance
apparently prohibited waste from within the City from being sent to either in-state
or out-of-state landfills other than the City's dump, the Ninth Circuit concluded,
"[W]e cannot assume, however, without more, that this interstate burden exists."
221
Because On the Green alleged only an intrastate burden, the Ninth Circuit held that
the Commerce Clause was not implicated.222
It is not clear whether the On the Green court meant to establish a bright-
line rule that intrastate shippers may never win a dormant Commerce Clause case
on the merits. The court made clear that it had not addressed whether "a plaintiff
must explicitly plead that it would tip its waste out of state in order to make a
Commerce Clause challenge. 223 The court held only that if a plaintiff explicitly
states that it intends to dispose only in in-state areas that the Clause is not
implicated.224 It is not clear how the Ninth Circuit would address the allegations of
BFI and Waste Management that they transported waste from the six members
218. Id. at 1239-40. "Like the Washoe plaintiffs, On the Green would be forced to
pay for garbage services it did not want 'even if [Tacoma] were to dump all the garbage it
collects from [the city] across the state line.... Under those circumstances, the [Ordinance]
would impose no barrier to interstate commerce."' Id. at 1240 (quoting Washoe, 110 F.3d at
703-04).
219. Id. at 1240 ("On the Green's injury would be remedied if it could take its
garbage outside the city.... As On the Green's injury is thus related to the purposes
underlying the Commerce Clause, it has satisfied the prudential component of standing with
respect to its challenge to Tacoma's requirement that self-haulers tip at the city dump.").
220. Id. at 1241.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1242.
Where, as here, the plaintiff alleges only an intrastate burden, a court
cannot manufacture an interstate burden to implicate the Commerce
Clause. This is not to say that a plaintiff challenging a similar ordinance
must explicitly plead that it would tip its waste out of state in order to
make a Commerce Clause challenge. However, where a complaint
alleges only an intrastate burden, then the Commerce Clause is not at all
implicated. Because On the Green alleges only that absent the Tacoma
ordinance it would deposit its waste in another city in Washington, the
Commerce Clause is not implicated.
Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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only to in-state sites, but that the higher costs imposed by the six ordinances
adversely affected their regional and national contracts.225
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's standing analysis, the Ninth Circuit
appropriately concluded that an intrastate shipper can meet the "zone of interests"
test even if it may not succeed on the merits. Similar to the Houlton decision, the
On the Green court concluded that the plaintiff had zone of interests standing
because it could demonstrate clear economic harm from the ordinance's mandatory
requirement of tipping waste at the City landfill, a landfill that discriminated
against both intrastate and interstate commerce and competitors. Thus, the
plaintiff's allegation that it could tip more cheaply at other in-state landfills was
sufficient to meet the "zone of interests" test because the plaintiff suffered tangible
economic harm from the law comparable to out-of-state shippers.226 By contrast,
the plaintiffs self-hauling allegations were only marginally related to the interests
of the Clause because a ban on self-hauling only indirectly affected whether the
waste could be shipped out-of-state; in theory, the City could have banned self-
hauling but allowed unrestricted interstate shipping of the waste. Thus, the self-
hauling allegation is an example of a "marginal" or tangential interest that is
insufficient to justify a suit under the Clause.227 BFI and Waste Management's
allegations that they could dispose waste more cheaply at other Mississippi
landfills would clearly meet the "zone of interests" test in the Ninth Circuit.
2. Clarke Suggests a Less Stringent "Zone of Interests" Test
The Clarke Court stated that the "zone of interests" test was designed to
ensure that a plaintiff was "reliable," and thus functions to "exclude those
plaintiffs whose suits are more likely to frustrate than to further statutory
objectives., 228 The Clarke decision broadly interpreted which plaintiffs have
sufficient interests to meet the "zone of interests" test for the APA. Following the
spirit of the Clarke decision, intrastate waste firms that are directly regulated by a
flow control ordinance are reliable plaintiffs who should be able to challenge a
discriminatory ordinance in its entirety, including its interstate restrictions on
commerce. These firms are "reliable" because they share the same interests as
interstate firms in invalidating a restrictive flow control ordinance, compete with
the approved facilities favored by the challenged ordinance, and could enter
interstate markets if the ordinance is invalidated.2 29 Both the Houlton and On the
Green decisions imply that, if a flow control ordinance regulates both intrastate
and interstate waste, intrastate plaintiffs should have standing to challenge the
ordinance's interstate restrictions because they are harmed in essentially the same
225. See supra notes 7, 10-11, 186-87, 202-03 and accompanying text; infra
note 242 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 190-91, 208-10, 215, 219 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
228. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 397 n.12 (1987); see also Cert.
Petition, supra note 138, at 12-13 (arguing that the plaintiffs BFI and Waste Management
were "reliable" plaintiffs as defined by the Supreme Court in Clarke).
229. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 397-400; supra notes 205-06 and accompanying
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way as interstate shippers and have a concrete economic interest in challenging its
validity.230
Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers Union is
the one major case in which the Supreme Court has denied standing based on the
"zone of interests" test.23' The Court refused standing for postal employees and
their union to challenge a regulation suspending the Postal Service's previous
monopoly over certain international operations because the regulation did not
directly regulate the plaintiffs and affected them only indirectly. 232 By contrast,
intrastate waste firms that are regulated by a flow control ordinance are affected
directly.233 The argument that BFI and Waste Management were reliable plaintiffs
that had a concrete interest in challenging the ordinances on their face is
strengthened by the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the plaintiffs met the "zone of
interests" test to challenge them under the Pike balancing test. The Circuit based
its conclusion on the fact that they had adequately alleged that the higher costs
imposed by the ordinances at issue would raise their overall cost of servicing
regional and national contracts, and thus harm their competitive position in serving
waste customers outside Mississippi.
234
Because they are competitors to the government-sponsored waste
facilities that benefit from flow control ordinances, intrastate waste firms should be
within the zone of interests to challenge such ordinances.235 In statutory cases, the
Court has emphasized that competitors are usually within the zone of interests. In
Clarke, the Court stated that "competitors who allege an injury that implicates the
policies of the National Bank Act are very reasonable candidates to seek review of
the Comptroller's rulings. 236  Subsequently, in National Credit Union
Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co.,237 the Court held that banks
were arguably within the "zone of interests" to be protected by a provision of the
Federal Credit Union Act limiting federal credit union membership to members of
definable groups. The banks had standing because "[a]s competitors of federal
credit unions, respondents certainly have an interest in limiting the markets that
federal credit unions can serve, and the [National Credit Union Administration]'s
interpretation has affected that interest by allowing federal credit unions to
increase their customer base. 238
230. See supra notes 195-96, 207-10, 215, 219, 226 and accompanying text.
231. 498 U.S. 517 (1991).
232. Cert. Petition, supra note 138, at 13.
233. Id.
234. See Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Pine Belt Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 389 F.3d 491, 500-01 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 332 (2005); Cert.
Petition, supra note 138, at 12-13.
235. See Cert. Petition, supra note 138, at 9-10.
236. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987).
237. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479,
488 (1998), superseded by statute, Credit Union Membership Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
219, § 2, 112 Stat. 913, 914-15 (1998) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1759(b)), as recognized in
Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 271 F.3d 262 (2001).
238. Id. at 493-94 (emphasis added).
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In Clarke the Court clearly emphasizes that competitors are usually
within the zone of interests to challenge a statute or administrative decision
favoring a competitor.239 In addition, the Court's Bacchus and West Lynn
Creamery decisions suggest that those whose competitive interests are affected by
a discriminatory statute are within the zone of interests to challenge it under the
dormant Commerce Clause. Neither case, however, explicitly addressed prudential
240standing as an issue.
In light of the spirit of Clarke, Bacchus, and West Lynn Creamery, the
plaintiffs in NSWMA alleged sufficient facts demonstrating injury to their
competitive position to meet the "zone of interests" test.241 The plaintiffs were
clearly competitors to the Authority and its members, although only directly for
intrastate trade.242 Following the Ninth and First Circuits, the plaintiffs' allegations
of competitive injury from the ordinances' prohibition against in-state shipping
should be enough of an interest to justify a suit challenging the ordinances'
discrimination against both in-state and interstate competition.243 Further, BFI and
Waste Management alleged sufficient facts demonstrating that their broader
regional and national contracts and competitive positions are burdened by the
higher costs imposed by the Mississippi flow control ordinances to file a Pike
challenge alleging the ordinances impose excessive burdens on interstate trade.244
Thus, it makes little sense to prevent them from challenging the ordinances as
facially discriminatory as well, even though the plaintiffs do not actually ship
waste from locations within the Authority that have flow control ordinances to out-
of-state sites. 245
In both Bacchus and West Lynn Creamery, the Supreme Court considered
the impact of state laws discriminating against out-of-state goods or producers on
the competitive position of in-state firms in allowing them to bring Commerce
Clause challenges. These suits were not dismissed despite the arguments of both
Hawaii and Massachusetts that the wholesale dealers could pass the costs on to
their customers and that only out-of-state firms directly affected by the
discriminatory taxes or rebates should be able to sue. Neither case, however,
explicitly addressed prudential standing as an issue.246 The six ordinances had a
more direct impact on both BFI and Waste Management than the taxes or rebates
247on the plaintiffs in Bacchus and West Lynn Creamery. Because their waste
business is intertwined with both intrastate and interstate markets, the plaintiffs
239. See supra notes 228, 236 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
241. See Cert. Petition, supra note 138, at 12-13 (arguing that the plaintiffs BFI
and Waste Management were "reliable" plaintiffs as defined by the Supreme Court in
Clarke); supra notes 7, 10-11, 162-74, 186-87, 202-03, 207-10, 215, 219, 228, 236, 239
and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 7, 10-11, 186-87, 202-03 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 195-96, 207-10, 215, 219, 226 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 7, 10-11, 186-87, 202-03, 242 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 10-11, 186-87, 202-03, 242, 244 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 7, 10-11, 162-74, 186-87, 202-03, 242, 244-45 and
accompanying text.
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had sufficient interests to challenge the ordinances under both the per se and Pike
standards.
3. There Is Not a Clear Distinction Between the Per Se and Pike Tests
The Fifth Circuit's distinction in analyzing the "zone of interests" test
separately for the per se test and the Pike standard is unconvincing because the line
between laws that are per se invalid or invalid under the Pike test is often too
difficult to discern. Therefore, it makes little sense for a court to deny prudential
standing under the per se test, but to recognize standing pursuant to a Pike
challenge.248 In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Authority,
249
the Supreme Court acknowledged that "there is no clear line separating the
category of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the Commerce
Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing
approach.,250 Laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce are
relatively easy to classify as fitting within the per se category. Courts have had
more difficulty, however, in determining whether facially neutral statutes that have
a discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effects fit within the per se or Pike
categories because the Supreme Court has not provided a clear standard for which
test applies.2 In his concurring opinion in West Lynn Creamery, Justice Scalia
observed: "[O]nce one gets beyond facial discrimination our negative-Commerce-
Clause jurisprudence becomes (and long has been) a 'quagmire.' 25 2 He has also
argued that the Court should consider abolishing the doctrine because it is not in
the text of the Constitution and "in the 114 years since the doctrine of the negative
Commerce Clause was formally adopted as holding of this Court ... our
applications of the doctrine have, not to put too fine a point on the matter, made no
,25325
sense." In General Motors Corp. v. Tracy,254 the Court acknowledged that
"several cases that have purported to apply the undue burden test (including Pike
itself) arguably turned in whole or in part on the discriminatory character of the
challenged state regulations ... .,,255 Similarly, in South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc.
v. Hazeltine,256 the Eighth Circuit noted that "the Supreme Court has not laid out a
specific test for determining discriminatory purpose"; as a result, "[d]iscriminatory
248. Cert. Petition, supra note 138, at 14.
249. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
250. Id. at 579.
251. Kendall, supra note 30, at 10460; Zebot, supra note 32, at 1065 & n.15; see
Lawrence, supra note 45, at 419 ("The Court has not clearly stated which of these three
types of discrimination ... should be given the most weight in determining the validity of a
state statute or, for that matter, how these three types should interrelate.").
252. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458
(1959)).
253. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-
65 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing for the replacement of the
dormant Commerce Clause with the Import-Export Clause).
254. 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
255. Id. at 300 n. 12; Kendall, supra note 30, at 10460.
256. 340 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1037 (2004).
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purpose .. is often incorporated into both first-tier analysis and second-tier Pike
balancing analysis. 25 7
Because the line between the per se and Pike tests is so unclear, the Fifth
Circuit's use of a separate zone of interests analysis for each test makes little
sense. To avoid the complexities that arise from applying both the "zone of
interests" test and dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, courts in challenges to
discriminatory local laws should allow any plaintiff who meets Article III standing
to sue unless their suit raises true policy concerns.25 8
CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit in NSWMA used the "zone of interests" test to defeat
rather than support the dormant Commerce Clause's interest in striking down
barriers to interstate commerce. In On the Green, the Ninth Circuit appropriately
treated standing as a threshold question separate from the merits of the case 25 9 and
found that an intrastate shipper could meet the "zone of interests" test even though
the court ruled against the same plaintiff on the merits because it was an intrastate
shipper. 260 Based on its discussion of On the Green, the Fifth Circuit appears to
have assumed that a plaintiff is in the zone of interests only if it can win on the
merits, but that approach contradicts the Circuit's own precedent that standing is a
threshold question separate from the merits.26' It also contradicts the Clarke
decision, which, like the On the Green decision, found that the challengers had
zone of interests standing even though they lost on the merits.262 The Court does
not usually consider how the invalidation of a statute under the dormant
Commerce Clause will affect the plaintiffs in that case, but focuses instead on the
overall impact of the law on interstate commerce. Consequently, it makes little
sense to impose stricter requirements for standing, including proof that the plaintiff
is engaged in interstate commerce, than the Court typically considers in evaluating
the substance of a dormant Commerce Clause claim.263 The Fifth Circuit used the
zone of interests standing test to avoid considering whether the six ordinances
violated the dormant Commerce Clause's per se standard. As a result, the Fifth
Circuit failed to protect the dormant Commerce Clause's interest in invalidating
flow control ordinances that facially discriminated against interstate commerce.
264
The Fifth Circuit's hair-splitting distinction that the plaintiffs failed the
"zone of interests" test to bring a facial, per se challenge, but met the test under the
Pike test because they are affiliated with national waste firms that are allegedly
burdened by the ordinances' higher costs ignores the Supreme Court's admission
that the line between the per se and Pike tests is often unclear.265 If the ordinances
257. Id. at 596 & n.8 (citing Zebot, supra note 32, at 1077-84); Kendall, supra
note 30, at 10460.
258. See infra notes 259-89 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 154-74 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 183-227 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 43-46, 248-57 and accompanying text.
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burden BFI and Waste Management with higher costs that affect both companies'
regional and national competitiveness, why are they not within the zone of
interests for the per se test as well?266 In Bacchus and West Lynn Creamery, the
Supreme Court allowed in-state wholesalers to bring dormant Commerce Clause
challenges because of possible and unsubstantiated impacts on their competitive
position even though only out-of-state interests were directly affected.267 The
financial impact of the six ordinances on BFI and Waste Management's regional
and national contracts was clearer than the impact on the in-state wholesalers in
Bacchus and West Lynn Creamery. Because of these clear impacts, the Fifth
Circuit should have recognized that the plaintiffs met the "zone of interests" test to
challenge the ordinances under both the Pike and the per se tests.
From a broader perspective, the NSWMA decision shows why it makes
little sense to impose an additional "zone of interests" test on plaintiffs who meet
the three-part constitutional standing test and are raising a constitutional
challenge. 68 In 1970, before the Court had fully developed a constitutional
standing test, the Data Processing Court's inclusion of plaintiffs making
constitutional challenges in the "zone of interests" test may have made sense,
although Justice Brennan in his Data Processing dissent foresaw the difficulties of
applying the test.269 After the Court had fully developed the Article III standing
test, Justice White in his Clarke majority opinion correctly sought to limit the
"zone of interests" test to APA cases and other statutory suits that seek to
determine congressional intent.270 As Professor Siegel and Professors Kelso each
suggest, the "zone of interests" test should be limited to federal statutory cases
where congressional intent to allow or prohibit certain types of suits is a relevant
concern.
271
Justice Scalia's argument that courts should apply a stricter "zone of
interests" test in constitutional cases makes little sense other than as an artificial
way to restrict the number of constitutional cases.272 Additionally, Justice Scalia's
implication in Wyoming that only direct beneficiaries of interstate trade are within
the zone of interests failed to demonstrate why the test should not include indirect
beneficiaries and did not offer a workable test for distinguishing between direct
and indirect beneficiaries. 273 He failed to reconcile his approach with Boston Stock
Exchange's holding that the plaintiffs had zone of interests standing because a
New York transfer tax "indirectly infring[ed]" their ability to engage in interstate
266. See supra notes 7, 10-11, 162-74, 186-87, 202-03, 242, 244-45 and
accompanying text.
267. Neither Bacchus nor West Lynn Creamery explicitly addressed prudential
standing, although the doctrine was applicable at the time of each decision. See West Lynn
Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984);
supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 83-86, 99-102 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 83-86, 103-09 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 121-30, 146 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 23, 110, 181, 206 and accompanying text.
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commerce, or with that Court's implication that indirect beneficiaries are within
the Clause's zone of interests. 74
Unlike Justice Scalia, many judges and commentators believe that federal
courts ought to vindicate the constitutional rights of those who meet Article III
standing and not add unnecessary standing barriers to limit the number of suits.
275
Furthermore, given the difficulty the Court has had in defining when a plaintiff
meets the "zone of interests" test in statutory cases, it makes little sense for courts
to use the "zone of interests" test in addressing complex constitutional interests
that are difficult to define.276 Justice Scalia himself has argued that its dormant
Commerce Clause case law is so confusing that the Court should abolish the
doctrine. z77 Justice White's reasons for limiting the "zone of interests" test to
statutory cases, especially APA cases, makes more sense than Justice Scalia's
theory of using the test to prevent plaintiffs who meet Article III standing
requirements from vindicating constitutional rights. 7 8
Moreover, in dormant Commerce Clause cases, a typical plaintiffs
lawsuit generally benefits interstate trade, even if the plaintiff's underlying
motives for suing are unrelated to interstate commerce. Wyoming's indirect and
parochial interest in taxes provides an example. 279 A recent D.C. Circuit decision
stated that a competitor motivated by commercial interests normally meets the
"zone of interests" test if its interests are "congruent" with the statute and its suit
will "advance, rather than hinder, the operation of the statute" even if its
underlying motivations are different from the statute.280 Thus, the Court should
apply liberal standing rules in dormant Commerce Clause cases and allow suits by
intrastate businesses harmed by a law that also discriminates against interstate
commerce unless its suit would "hinder" interstate trade. 28' Following the spirit of
Clarke, courts should recognize that intrastate waste carriers harmed by a
discriminatory ordinance that discriminates against both intrastate and interstate
commerce are usually "reliable" plaintiffs that may raise dormant Commerce
Clause challenges.
In general, courts should as a matter of policy allow constitutional suits
by plaintiffs who meet Article III standing requirements if their suit serves the
274. 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977) (stating that the plaintiffs "are asserting their
right under the Commerce Clause to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminatory
taxes on their business and they allege that the transfer tax indirectly infringes on that right.
Thus, they are 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected ... by the ...
constitutional guarantee in question' (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970))); see supra notes 23, 110, 181, 206, 273 and
accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 94, 131, 149-53 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 43-46, 248-57 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 27, 46, 253 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 117-19, 122, 150 and accompanying text.
280. Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 374 F.3d 1363, 1370 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (per curiam), modified on other grounds, 393 F.3d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per
curiam).
281. See supra notes 205-47, 258 and accompanying text.
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interests of the constitutional provision at issue and they are "reliable" plaintiffs
capable of pursuing the suit in good faith.282 Courts should not use the "zone of
interests" test simply to limit the number of constitutional suits in federal courts as
Justice Scalia has proposed.283 If it abolishes the "zone of interests" test for
constitutional cases, the Court's Article III standing requirements are sufficiently
restrictive to prevent frivolous constitutional suits, and courts could still apply
other prudential limitations to standing.28 4
The issue of prudential standing is especially relevant today with Chief
Justice Rehnquist's death and Justice O'Connor's retirement. Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito could help support Justice Scalia's goal of expanding the "zone
of interests" test to prevent review of many constitutional cases.285 Ideally, they
should instead follow Justice White's argument in Clarke that the zone of interests
should not be applied to constitutional cases because the test is hard to apply and is
unnecessary in light of the Court's now stringent three-part test for Article III
standing.28
See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 127, 146-48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 19-21, 114 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17, 99, 107 and accompanying text.

